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"[T]he time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the
question of what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees would pose
substantial burdens for judicial administration." 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Texas, like most other states, follows the so-called American Rule
whereby each party must pay its own attorney's fees. Though no
common-law jurisdiction other than the United States and virtually
no other industrialized democracy follows this rule,2 several important considerations are said to support it. The primary justification is
that litigants in general, and the poor in particular, might be reluctant
to come to court at the risk of having to pay an opponent's fees.'
Second, as noted in the quotation above, allowing recovery of fees
1. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (citing
Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 231 (1872)).
2. Kenneth W. Staff, The Shifting Panoramaof Attorney's Fees Awards: The Expansion
of Fee Recoveries in Federal Court, 28 S.TEX. L. REV. 189, 189 (1986).
3. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
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would mean additional litigation, with the attendant time and
expense.
In recent years, the American Rule has been partially repealed by
legislation. Literally thousands of federal and state statutes now provide for recovery of fees under certain circumstances. 5 These statutes
usually accommodate the primary concern of the American Rule by
making fee recovery a one-way street. The party bringing the claim
may recover fees if successful, but will not be liable for the other
party's fees if unsuccessful. These laws rarely address the second concern, namely, the burdens attendant upon litigating fee awards.
It is the second concern that this paper addresses. The growth in
the extent and effect of fee litigation makes these issues of increasing
importance. Yet, the rules governing proof of attorney's fees are often
complex and confusing. Hundreds of cases address proof of attorney's fees but legal digests usually scatter the cases among the titles
devoted to the underlying substantive claims. Frequent legislative
changes and anomalies may render prior law of limited value. Courts
may or may not apply rules developed under one statute to cases controlled by another and they rarely analyze whether application is
proper. In this article, some complexities will be addressed and several suggestions made to simplify proof of attorney's fees in Texas.
II.

WHEN ATrORNEY's FEES ARE RECOVERABLE

Generally, in Texas attorney's fees are recoverable only if a statute
specifically provides or the parties expressly contract for such recovery.6 A complete listing of the statutes providing for recovery of attorney's fees is beyond the scope of this article.7 However, the vast
majority of cases addressing proof of attorney's fees in Texas arise
either in contract cases governed by Chapter 38 of the Texas Civil
4. Id.
5. Kenneth W. Starr, The Shifting Panoramaof Attorney's Fees Awards: The Expansion
of Fee Recoveries in Federal Court, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 189, 195 n.36 (1986).
6. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1967);
Mundy v. Knutson Constr. Co., 156 Tex. 211, 214, 294 S.W.2d 371, 373 (1956) (quoting
William Cameron & Co. v. American Surety Co., 55 S.W.2d 1032, 1035 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1932, holding approved).
7. WILLIAM DORSANEO, IA TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 22.200 (1992). In his TEXAS
LITIGATION GUIDE, Professor Dorsaneo lists over fifty such provisions. Id. Another source
sets the total figure at more than 100. Ralph H. Brock, Statutory Attorney Fees in Texas: 1984
Update, 47 TEX. BAR J. 752, 754 (1984).
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Practice and Remedies Code' (Chapter 38), or in deceptive trade
practice (DTPA) claims.9 The rules of proof applicable in Chapter 38
and DTPA cases usually apply in other contexts.' 0 Nonetheless, special rules or exceptions may govern other statutory provisions' and
these exceptions should be researched to supplement the general comments in this article.
Attorney's fees normally are available only to the party asserting 13a
2
claim, whether breach of contract or violation of the DTPA.
However, if a consumer's action is groundless and brought in bad
faith or to harass, the DTPA allows the defending party to recover

attorney's fees."' Also, in contract cases both parties often can assert
that the other breached the contract, thus allowing either to recover.' 5
Attorney's fees incurred before filing suit, or even before the opposing party knows of the claim, are recoverable.' 6 Fees incurred in proceedings in another court are also recoverable if they relate directly to
obtaining recovery on the claim at issue."
8. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§38.001-.006 (Vernon 1986).
9. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon 1987).
10. See, e.g., Carlyle Real Estate Ltd. Partnership-X v. Leibman, 782 S.W.2d 230, 233
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ) (stating that attorney's fees under turnover
statute-TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(e) (Vernon 1986)-governed by
Chapter 38 provisions).
11. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.005 (Vernon 1986) (mandating that
Chapter 38 and DTPA provisions for fees be liberally construed); see also TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon 1987) (construing statutes liberally). Other statutory provisions
for fees are considered penal in nature, thus requiring strict construction. Knebel v. Capital
Nat'l Bank in Austin, 518 S.W.2d 795, 804 (Tex. 1974).
12. American Airlines, Inc. v. Swest, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tex. 1986); Pileco, Inc.
v. HCI, Inc., 735 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). To
the extent a third party beneficiary may bring suit on the contract, the third party may also
recover attorney's fees. Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Childress, 650 S.W.2d 770,
775-76 (Tex. 1983).
13. See Ames v. Great Southern Bank, 672 S.W.2d 447, 450-51 (Tex. 1984) (striking
defendant's claim for attorney's fees).
14. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon 1987).
15. See De La Rosa v. Kaples, 812 S.W.2d 432, 433 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ
denied) (illustrating that either party can recover attorney's fees). A different rule may apply
where one party's claim was undisputed. See Davis Masonry, Inc. v. B-F-W Constr. Co., Inc.,
639 S.W.2d 448, 448 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam) (allowing only prevailing party to recover attorney's fees); Criton Corp. v. Highlands, Ins. Co., 809 S.W.2d 355, 357-58 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (noting that defendant's general and specific denials and claims
for damages constitute claims upon which attorney's fees may be awarded).
16. Williamson v. Tucker, 615 S.W.2d 881, 893 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
17. Id.; see Gill Say. Ass'n v. Chair King, Inc., 797 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Tex. 1990) (related
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Attorney's fees generally are available only to a party who is at
least partially successful.18 A claimant does not need a net recovery,
as a fee award cannot be defeated by offsets.' 9 However, a mere technical breach without any resulting damage may not support a fee
award.2 0 Equitable relief will support a fee award.2 1
Generally, because attorney's fees are just one element of the total
damage incurred as a result of actionable conduct, the fees are an
integral part of the underlying claim. Thus, fees must be sought in
the suit on the underlying claim or they will be barred under principles of res judicata.22
2a
Recovery of attorney's fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act
is more broadly available than under other statutes. In such cases, a
fee award is completely discretionary. 24 The amount of attorney's
fees is an equitable decision for the court, although some courts
apparently ask a jury to make an advisory fee determination. 25
The court may award fees to any party, including the party
defending against the action,2 6 the party who loses,27 or no one at
bankruptcy proceeding); Boulware v. Security State Bank of Navasota, 640 S.W.2d 735, 737
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ) (related court of claims proceeding).
18. Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 230-31 (Tex. 1990) (requiring success
under DTPA as prerequisite); LaFreniere v. Fitzgerald, 669 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Tex. 1984) (ruling under Chapter 38 that party asking for attorney's fees must be partially successful).
19. See Matthews v. Candlewood Builders, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. 1985) (allowing recovery of fees though Chapter 38 claim offset by counterclaim); McKinley v. Drozd,
685 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex. 1985) (not requiring net recovery because DTPA and Article 2226
claims offset by counterclaim).
20. Rodgers v. RAB Invs., Ltd., 816 S.W.2d 543, 551 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
21. Carr v. Austin Forty, 744 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
22. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Robert P. Kaminsky, 820 S.W.2d 878, 882 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1991, n.w.h.); John M. Gillis v. Wilbur, 700 S.W.2d 734, 736-37 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
23. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001-.011 (Vernon 1986); see Emmco Ins.
Co. v. Burrows, 419 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no writ) (illustrating example of case where attorney's fees were readily available).
24. Oake v. Collin County, 692 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Tex. 1985).
25. Smith v. Shar-Alan Oil Co., 799 S.W.2d 368, 374 (Tex. App.-Waco 1990, writ
denied).
26. Duncan v. Pogue, 759 S.W.2d 435, 435-36 (Tex. 1988); Ritchie v. City of Fort Worth,
730 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). However, as the Act
cannot be used merely as a mirror-image counterclaim on a controversy already before the
court, attorney's fees cannot be recovered in this situation. John Chezik Buick v. Friendly
Chevrolet, 749 S.W.2d 591, 594-95 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
27. Tanglewood Homes Ass'n v. Henke, 728 S.W.2d 39, 44-45 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); District Judges v. Commissioners Ct. of Collin County, 677
S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); but cf. Galveston County
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all.28 It is not necessary that the case actually go to trial, and fees are
recoverable even if the declaratory claim is nonsuited.29
III.

PRETRIAL PREREQUISITES

There are several prerequisites to proving attorney's fees at trial.
Particularly, proof and recovery of attorney's fees may be barred unless there has been a demand, a pleading, and a designation.
A.

Demand

Both Chapter 38 and the DTPA require that a party plead and
prove demand.30 The pleadings themselves do not constitute demand. 3 ' Originally, this was because fee statutes requiring demand
were strictly construed.32 Although strict construction often no
longer applies, the rule probably remains because without it demand
would exist in every case filed, and the requirement would be a
nullity.
Under Chapter 38, the demand requirement is almost a nullity anyway. A Chapter 38 demand may be sent as late as thirty days before
judgment,33 though it is unclear what good a demand will do at that
Comm'rs Ct. v. Lohec, 814 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ)
(disallowing attorney's fees award to losing party); Advertising & Policy Comm. of the Avis
Rent A Car Sys. v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 780 S.W.2d 391, 403 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1989) (denying attorney's fees award to party losing declaratory judgment), vacated as
moot, 796 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. 1990); City of Houston v. Harris County Outdoor Advertising
Ass'n, 732 S.W.2d 42, 56 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding
abuse of discretion to award party attorney's fees when party loses declaratory judgment
action).
28. City of Port Arthur v. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 397, 807 S.W.2d
894, 901 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied).
29. Falls County v. Perkins & Cullum, 798 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1990, no writ).
30. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.002(2) (Vernon 1986); TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.505(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992); see Ellis v. Waldrop, 656 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex.
1983) (holding that recovering attorney's fees in contract claim requires pleading and proving
presentment).
31. Huff v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 158 Tex. 433, 443-44, 312 S.W.2d 493, 500
(1958).
32. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Britton, 406 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Tex. 1966).
33. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.002(3) (Vernon 1986); Dobins v. Redden,
759 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988), aff'd as modified, 785 S.W.2d 377 (Tex.
1990); Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Preis, 695 S.W.2d 579, 589 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stuckey v. White, 647 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1982, no writ).
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point. No particular form of demand is necessary and any written or
oral communication will suffice if it shows that the claimant expects
to be paid. 34 The following have been held sufficient to satisfy the
demand requirement:
35
1. The original bill or invoice sent to a buyer;
36
2. A notation on a check that it is paid under protest;
37
3. A discovery request such as a request for admission;
4. An oral demand at a deposition;3"
39
5. A discussion among the attorneys about the claim;
6. A demand letter that was never received, but was produced during
discovery and attached to motions;' and
7. A prior lawsuit.4 1
42
Demand for one claim cannot serve as demand on a different claim.
However, citing the wrong theories does not make a demand insuffi43
cient if the underlying dispute is clear.
The DTPA demand requirement is slightly more exacting. The
DTPA demand must be sent sixty days before filing suit, must be in
writing, and must state "in reasonable detail" the nature of the
claims, the amount of actual damages, and the attorney's fees

34. Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. 1981); Criton Corp. v. Highlands Ins. Co.,
809 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
35. De Los Santos v. Southwest Tex. Methodist Hosp., 802 S.W.2d 749, 757 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ); Adams v. Petrade Int'l, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 696, 719 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
36. Tierney v. Lane, Gorman, Trubitt & Co., 664 S.W.2d 840, 843-44 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
37. Humble Exploration Co. v. Amcap Petroleum Assocs.-1977, 658 S.W.2d 860, 863
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
38. Marifarm Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Westhoff, 802 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1991, no writ).
39. Chandler v. Mastercraft Dental Corp. of Tex., 739 S.W.2d 460, 470 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1987, writ denied); Plains Ins. Co. v. Evans, 692 S.W.2d 952, 956-57 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1985, no writ).
40. Bethel v. Norman Furniture Co., 756 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1988, no writ).
41. Hudson v. Smith, 391 S.W.2d 441, 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); but cf. Jim Howe Homes, Inc. v. Rogers, 818 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. App.-Austin
1991, no writ) (filing of suit by itself deemed insufficient).
42. High Plains Wire Line Servs. v. Hysell Wire Line Serv., 802 S.W.2d 406, 410 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1991, no writ); Williams v. Back, 624 S.W.2d 272, 277 (Tex. App.-Austin
1981, no writ).
43. Adams, 754 S.W.2d at 719.
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sought." However, the demand need not state the particular DTPA
section violated 45 nor an exact dollar figure if the amount of the demand is reasonably clear. 4" Further, if the demand is sent after filing
suit but before trial, the courts may consider this error as harmless.
The effect of an excessive demand depends upon the statute involved. Under Chapter 38, a demand that is unreasonably excessive8
will be held improper and attorney's fees will be disallowed.
Although a demand greater than the eventual judgment is some evidence of excessiveness, this alone will not make the demand improper.4 9 However, a demand exceeding a liquidated claim and
actions showing that tender of the liquidated amount is unacceptable
will bar recovery. 5° Failure to credit an unrelated claim does not
make a demand excessive. 5 ' Under the DTPA, an excessive demand
does not create any bar to recovery. However, if the party receiving
the demand makes a settlement offer within sixty days and the offer is
substantially the same as the actual damages awarded at trial, the
claimant's recovery will be limited to the amount in the settlement
offer. 52

The effect of failing to plead and prove demand also depends upon
the statute involved. Under Chapter 38, such failure bars recovery of
attorney's fees but does not bar recovery of any underlying award on
the contract.13 Under the DTPA, the only sanction generally entered
44. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.505(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992); Hollingsworth
Roofing Co. v. Morrison, 668 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).

45. Barnard v. Mecom, 650 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
46. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 137 (Tex. 1988) (holding notice given was sufficient to meet requirements of DTPA).
47. Star-Tel, Inc. v. Nacogdoches Telecommunications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tex.

App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
48. Findlay v. Cave, 611 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Tex. 1981).

49. Id.

50. Id.; Collingsworth v. King, 283 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Tex. 1955); Strickland v. Coleman,
824 S.W.2d 188, 193 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
51. Myers v. Ginsburg, 735 S.W.2d 600, 605-06 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
52. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.505(d) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
53. Texas Am. Corp. v. Woodbridge Joint Venture, 809 S.W.2d 299, 304-05 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1991, writ denied); Mendleski v. Silvertooth, 798 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1990, no writ); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Responsive Terminal Sys., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 738, 749 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied); Shearer v. Allied Live Oak Bank, 758
S.W.2d 940, 946 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied); Wilson v. Ferguson, 747
S.W.2d 499, 504 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied).
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for failing to send notice is abatement to allow demand. 54 Thus, even
if the DTPA case has already been tried, absence of demand requires

remand to the trial court for demand to be sent and then the case
retried." If after abatement the claimant still refuses to give proper
notice, then the claim may be dismissed without prejudice. 6
Under both statutes, failure to object waives the requirement that
demand be pled and proved.5 7 Generally, the pleading requirement is

waived absent a special exception or plea in abatement.58 The proof
requirement may be waived if: (1) the answer does not specifically
deny demand after the claimant pled demand;5 9 (2) there is no objection to the jury question on fees;' or (3) there is no objection to omission of a jury question concerning demand. 6 '

As the above shows, the usefulness of the demand requirement is
far outweighed by the litigation it generates. If the only purpose of
requiring demand is to encourage settlement, it seems ill-suited for
that purpose, especially in Chapter 38 demands which may be sent at

54. Hash v. Hines, 796 S.W.2d 312, 314-15 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ); HOW
Ins. Co. v. Patriot Fin. Servs. of Tex., 786 S.W.2d 533, 538 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ
denied); The Moving Co. v. Whitten, 717 S.W.2d 117, 123-24 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sunshine Datsun, Inc. v. Ramsey, 680 S.W.2d 652, 654-55 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ); but cf. Hollingsworth Roofing Co., 668 S.W.2d at 875 (barring
treble damages).
55. Hash, 796 S.W.2d at 314-15; HOW Ins. Co., 786 S.W.2d at 538.
56. Miller v. Kossey, 802 S.W.2d 873, 876-77 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, writ denied).
57. Pool Co. v. Salt Grass Exploration, Inc., 681 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
58. Id.; TEX. R. Civ. P. 90; Paramount Pipe & Supply Co. v. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d 491, 496
(Tex. 1988); Mendleski, 798 S.W.2d at 32; Silva v. Porowski, 695 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
59. TEX. R. Civ. P. 54; White Budd Van Ness Partnership v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint
Venture, 798 S.W.2d 805, 816-17 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ dism'd); LaChalet Int'l v.
Nowik, 787 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ); Plaza Nat'l Bank v. Walker,
767 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, writ denied); see Investors, Inc. v. Hadley,
738 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ denied) (holding that proof
needed regardless of pleadings); cf. All Valley Acceptance Co. v. Durfey, 800 S.W.2d 672, 676
(Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied) (stating that general denial puts demand in issue).
60. Arch Constr., Inc. v. Tyburec, 730 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Silva, 695 S.W.2d at 768.
61. Cielo Dorado Dev. v. Certainteed Corp., 744 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Tex. 1988) (determining
that where there was some evidence of demand, issue deemed to support judgment); Adams,
754 S.W.2d at 719; but cf. Jim Howe Homes, Inc., 818 S.W.2d at 904 (following judgment
n.o.v. as proper means of preserving error); Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Davila,
805 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied) (holding that despite
failure to object to charge, if no evidence of demand, issue could not be deemed to support
judgment).
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the last minute. Referral to alternative dispute resolution seems much
more likely to encourage settlement than a demand letter drafted for
maximum impact on the opposing party or a jury. If the purpose is to
ascertain the exact amount and nature of a party's claim, special exceptions and discovery are much better suited for this purpose. The
DTPA's mandatory abatement for demand is especially wasteful, requiring delay or even retrial although all the players are familiar with
the claim. There is no reason for a mandatory last-minute continuance when there is no prejudice. Given the ineffectiveness of the demand requirements and the potential for wasteful appeals and retrials
that they create, the legislature should consider whether this requirement perhaps does more harm than good.
However, so long as demand letters are required, they should be
drafted carefully. No threats are necessary; a polite request is sufficient.6 2 Demands with a bullying tone may offend jurors when introduced at trial. If the claims made in the demand prove unfounded, or
the focus of the suit shifts before trial to different claims, a party's
credibility and motives can be questioned. Similarly, claims stated as
positive facts that are ascertainable only from sources obtained later
may indicate that the claimant jumped to a conclusion and then
looked for supporting facts.
B.

Pleading

An award of attorney's fees must be supported by proper pleading. 6 3 The law requires no particular form and so mention of attorney's fees, even in the prayer of the complaint, will support an award
for both trial and appellate work.' Courts have upheld attorney's fee
62. See Carr v. Austin Forty, 744 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied) (stating polite request for demand is sufficient); North Am. Van Lines of Tex., Inc. v.
Bauerle, 678 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating threat
not required because purpose of notice is to inform of complaint and allow possible
settlement).
63. See O'Connell v. Hitt, 730 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ)
(holding that facts for particular relief sought must be pleas); Ortiz v. 0. J. Beck & Sons, 611
S.W.2d 860, 866 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (following TEX. R. Civ. P.
227 requiring written pleading requesting fees).
64. Bullock v. Regular Veterans Ass'n of the U.S., 806 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Tex. App.Austin 1991, n.w.h.); Bethel v. Norman Furniture Co., 756 S.W.2d 6, 8-9 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ); Ledisco Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Viracola, 533 S.W.2d 951, 958 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ); but cf Rio Fresh, Inc. v. Consolidated Produce Brokers, 710 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ) (ruling that judge
abused discretion in awarding fees where no evidence of request for fees).
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awards despite pleadings based on the wrong ground or statute. 6 5
Courts have even awarded fees based on pleadings that make no mention of "attorney's fees" but merely allege an unpaid demand. 66 However, a pleading for "costs" is insufficient to support an award of
attorney's fees. 67
If a pleading requests fees when they are not recoverable, the opposing party should make a special exception to eliminate such
claims.68 If there is no pleading for fees, the opposing party must
object to any jury question regarding fees or the pleading defect is
waived. 69 Even if the opposing party does object, the claimant still
can request a trial amendment if there is some evidence to support a
fee award.7 °
Usually, the pleadings should not request a specific dollar figure, as
a reasonable fee can rarely be determined with accuracy until trial.
Still, a claimant may recover more than a specifically pled amount by
requesting a trial amendment to conform the pleadings to the
evidence.7 1
C.

Designation
Finally, the same discovery and designation rules applicable to all

65. See Canales v. Zapatero, 773 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ
denied) (allowing attorney's fees under Declaratory Judgment Act); Bellefonte Underwriters
Ins. Co. v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 574-75 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 704 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1986) (holding attorney's fees
precluded only when plaintiff has other access to attorney's fees); Porter v. Irvine, 658 S.W.2d
711, 715 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ) (allowing attorney's fees under general pleading).
66. See Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. 1981) (allowing attorney's fees on
pleading that land was demanded but not conveyed); Stuckey v. White, 647 S.W.2d 35, 38
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ) (citing Jones, 614 S.W.2d at 100).
67. See Birdwell v. Birdwell, 819 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no
writ) (finding pleading insufficient to raise issue of attorney's fees for summary judgment
purposes).
68. Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 537 S.W.2d 55, 62-64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1976), rev'd in part on other grounds, 554 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1977).
69. Olivares v. Porter Poultry & Egg Co., 523 S.W.2d 726, 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1975, no writ).
70. Ortiz, 611 S.W.2d at 866.
71. Mr. W. Fireworks, Inc. v. Mitchell, 622 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex. 1981); Rotello v. Ring
Around Prods., Inc., 614 S.W.2d 455, 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); see Greehalgh v. Service Lloyds Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 938, 939-41 (Tex. 1990)
(holding that pleadings may be amended prior to judgment). Even if there is no trial amendment, the limitation to the amount pled is waived if there is no objection. Siegler v. Williams,
658 S.W.2d 236, 241 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1983, no writ).
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expert testimony 72 govern proof of attorney's fees. Because the reasonableness of attorney's fees is not a matter within the common
knowledge of most jurors, expert testimony is necessary. 73 A party

receiving an appropriate discovery request must designate the attorney(s) who will testify concerning fees. Without this designation, expert testimony will be barred 74 or any fee award based on such
testimony will be disallowed."

IV.
A.

EVIDENCE

Plaintiff's Case

Generally, an attorney's fee award is a fact issue that must be supported by competent evidence. 76 The question to be determined is the
reasonable fee for the case. The amount of attorney's fees actually
paid, while relevant, is neither required nor sufficient. Proof of the
amount of fees paid does not establish that such amount is either rea-

sonable or necessary. 77 Similarly, proof of the agreed-upon contingency fee does not establish that this amount is either reasonable or

necessary.78 Conversely, proof of appearing pro se does not bar
recovery.7 9

72. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(e), (6)(b).
73. See Thompson v. A.G. Nash & Co., 704 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no
writ) (refusing award of attorney's fees due to lack of supporting expert testimony).
74. Sharp v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 784 S.W.2d 669, 671-72 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam);
E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363, 364 (Tex. 1987); GATX Tank Erection
Corp. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 693 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
75. Sharp, 784 S.W.2d at 672; E.F.Hutton & Co., 741 S.W.2d at 364; Nelson v. Schanzer,
788 S.W.2d 81, 88 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied); but cf Gonzalez v.
Stevenson, 791 S.W.2d 250, 254 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (remanding for
new trial rather than reversing award).
76. International Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. 1971); Great Am.
Reserve Ins. Co. v. Britton, 406 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Tex. 1966).
77. Hill v. Pierce, 729 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Baja
Energy v. Ball, 669 S.W.2d 836, 840 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1984, no writ); Morgan v. Morgan,
657 S.W.2d 484, 492 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ dism'd).
78. Fairmont Homes, Inc. v. Upchurch, 704 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.]), modified on other grounds, 711 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); King v. Ladd,
624 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
79. See Campbell, Athey & Zukowski v. Thomasson, 863 F.2d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 1989)
(awarding fees to attorney appearing pro se); Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Coastal Ref. & Mktg.,
Inc., 754 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (allowing
fees for in-house counsel). A person or corporation represented pro se cannot recover fees.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.002(1) (Vernon 1986) (requiring representa-
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Of course, no evidence is necessary if the parties can stipulate to a
reasonable fee. For claimants, a stipulation removes any uncertainties
of proof and avoids possible jury prejudice about the size of the fee.
In return for the stipulation, the defendant may be able to negotiate a
fee figure lower than the evidence might otherwise support. However,
any stipulation should be drafted carefully to avoid unintended effects. For example, a party who stipulates to a reasonable fee cannot
later complain that the amount includes fees that are not recoverable.8 0 A party who stipulates that the judge can set a fee cannot later
complain if the judge awards nothing.8"
If there is no stipulation, then evidence must be introduced to establish the attorney's fees. The pattern for proving attorney's fees at
trial usually follows that used for expert testimony in general:
(1) present the expert's qualifications, and then (2) elicit the expert's
opinion, and (3) her support for the opinion.
1. Qualifications
The expertise of a witness on attorney's fees stems from both legal
training and experience with the type of case and fees at issue.
Although a nonlawyer may have extensive knowledge of customary
fees, only an attorney is qualified to assess the legal factors involved in
setting a reasonable fee. 82 Familiarity with local fees may be advisable
but should not be required. Licensed attorneys may practice anywhere in the state and there is no locality rule limiting attorney's fees
to those charged in the vicinity. 3 A new attorney without extensive
personal knowledge of fee charges can testify concerning a reasonable
fee based on hearsay, pursuant to Rule 703 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Evidence. 4 The fee need not be personalized to the experience of the
tion by attorney to recover fees); Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1090 (5th Cir.
1981) (concluding pro se litigant not entitled to recover fees).
80. Hauglum v. Durst, 769 S.W.2d 646, 651-52 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no
writ).
81. American Bank of Waco v. Waco Airmotive, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 163, 178 (Tex. App.Waco 1991, writ denied).
82. But see Austin Area Teachers Fed. Credit Union v. First City Bank, 825 S.W.2d 795,
801 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied) (recognizing that testimony by non-attorney considered, at least where court could also take judicial notice of reasonable fees).
83. See Brazos County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Salvaggio, 698 S.W.2d
173, 178 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that trier of fact
should consider amount charged by other attorneys).
84. Liptak v. Pensabene, 736 S.W.2d 953, 957-58 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ).
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particular attorney involved although this is one factor in setting the
amount.85
A party's trial attorney is qualified to testify on attorney's fees because he has personal knowledge of the work on the case.8 6 If the
expert witness is someone other than trial counsel, the witness should
establish what depositions, pleadings, time sheets, billing summaries,
conversations with counsel, or other matters the witness reviewed to
establish a foundation for the expert's opinions. 87 Again, under Rule
703 the opinion is admissible even if based totally on hearsay.88
2.

Opinion

Generally, the expert witness should state an opinion as to a "reasonable and necessary" attorney's fee on the case. Many statutes contain this language89 and the courts recognize it as "a shorthand
version" indicating all the factors that should be considered by the
trier of fact. 9° Failure to introduce this proof often bars recovery of
fees. 9 Strictly speaking, however, proof of a "reasonable and necessary" fee is not required by all statutes. For example, Chapter 38
does not expressly require proof that fees are "necessary, ' ' 92 though
the concept may be implied. 93 Further, Chapter 38 provides a rebut85. City of Amarillo v. Langley, 651 S.W.2d 906, 916 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no
writ).
86. See Goad v. Goad, 768 S.W.2d 356, 359 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied)
(reasoning that attorney in best position to know fees and expenses); Nguyen Ngoc Giao v.
Smith & Lamm, P.C., 714 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ)
(holding affidavit by attorney considered expert testimony).
87. See Langley, 651 S.W.2d at 915-16 (discussing computation of fees by non-trial attorney as expert).
88. Liptak, 736 S.W.2d at 957-58.
89. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon 1987); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 1986).
90. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Tex. 1991).
91. See American Commercial Colleges, Inc. v. Davis, 821 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tex. App.Eastland 1991, n.w.h.) (requiring evidence to support award of fees); Bolton v. Alvarado, 762
S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (denying award for failure to prove fees).
92. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1986); Murrco Agency,
Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600, 606 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (allowing recovery of
attorney's fees); Prairie Valley Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sawyer, 665 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding proof of reasonableness sufficient).
93. See Gill Sav. Ass'n v. Chair King, Inc., 797 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Tex. 1990) (explaining
requirement for reasonableness, not proof of necessity).
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table presumption that customary fees are "reasonable." 94 Failure to
use the magic words may not be fatal if the underlying evidence establishes that the award is reasonable and necessary. 95 As with all other
forms of testimony, the attorney's testimony must be under oath, un96
less waived. An unsworn assertion is no evidence.
The standard formula for proof is to offer testimony concerning
(1) the hours of work done on the case, (2) the hourly rates of the
attorneys doing the work, and (3) the total fee resulting from multiplying these figures. The resulting number is called the "lodestar" in
many federal and state courts, 97 although there appears to be no re-

ported Texas case using the term. 98 However, many Texas cases hold
that proof of these elements alone is sufficient to support a fee
award. 99

Under Texas law, a plaintiff may prove that a contingency fee is a
reasonable attorney's fee.1t0

Several older cases have held that proof

94. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.003 (Vernon 1986); City of Houston v.
Blackbird, 658 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1983, writ dism'd). Such
presumption does not apply to DTPA or other claims outside Chapter 38. See Hill v. Pierce,
729 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (denying attorney's fees in
DTPA case); Fairmont Homes, Inc. v. Upchurch, 704 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.]) (illustrating denial of fees based on contingency), modified on other grounds, 711
S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).
95. Smith v. Smith, 757 S.W.2d 423, 426-27 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
96. Bloom v. Bloom, 767 S.W.2d 463, 470-71 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ
denied).
97. See, e.g., Graves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220, 222 (5th Cir. 1983) (focusing on method
adopted in 5th Circuit); Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 166-69 (3d Cir. 1973) (noting factors to be considered in awarding fees);
In re Estate of Platt, 586 So. 2d 328, 334 (Fla. 1991) (noting that "lodestar" method uses
criteria set out in Code of Professional Responsibility); Vogt v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 817
P.2d 1364, 1367-68 (Wash. 1991) (defining lodestar as hourly rate multiplied by hours
expended).
98. But see City of Dallas v. Arnett, 762 S.W.2d 942, 956 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ
denied) (quoting witness using term "lodestar").
99. Briercroft Serv. Corp. v. Perez, 820 S.W.2d 813, 817 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1990, n.w.h.); Carr v. Austin Forty, 744 S.W.2d 267, 270-71 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ
denied); Chrysler Corp. v. Schuenemann, 618 S.W.2d 799, 807 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Graves v. Sommerfeld, 618 S.W.2d 562, 954-56 (Tex. App.Waco 1981, no writ); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Licht, 544 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
100. General Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Higginbotham, 817 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied); March v. Thiery, 729 S.W.2d 889, 897 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1987, no writ); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 669 S.W.2d 750, 755 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 649
S.W.2d 121, 124-26 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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of a reasonable contingency percentage is not evidence of a reasonable
fee.101 However, these holdings appear to have relied primarily upon
former Texas Insurance Code Section 3.62; however, this section was
repealed in 1991 and no longer appears to be controlling. 102 Nonetheless, some courts prefer the "lodestar" format,10 3 so the better practice
is to offer testimony as to both a lodestar amount and a contingency
fee if applicable.
3. Support
The attorney's fee expert should present reasons supporting a stated
opinion. While an expert's opinion alone may support an attorney's
fee award, 1°4 it may be held factually insufficient without some evidence of its basis. 10 5 Additionally, if the expert's opinion is not per-

suasive, the trier of fact may award a lesser amount even if the
10 6
expert's testimony is uncontradicted.
The reasons cited by the expert should come from the list of legal
factors that may be considered in setting a reasonable fee. Texas cases
and the Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct list the following
factors:

101. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 620 S.W.2d 670, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1981, no writ); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Uribe, 595 S.W.2d 554, 570 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Smith v. Davis, 453 S.W.2d 340, 347 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
102. See Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Speakman, 736 S.W.2d 874, 885 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1987, no writ) (indicating shift in law).
103. Higgins v. Smith, 722 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no
writ).
104. See Great State Petroleum v. Arrow Rig Serv., 706 S.W.2d 803, 811-12 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth), modified, 714 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1986); Industrial Broadcasting Co. v.
Broadcasting Equip. Sales Co., 543 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
105. Smith v. Smith, 757 S.W.2d 423, 525-26 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied);
aff'd, 549 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex. 1977) ; Nguyen Ngoc Giao v. Smith & Lamm, P.C., 714
S.W.2d 144, 148 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ dism'd); Saums v. Saums, 610
S.W.2d 242, 243-44 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ dism'd); Meshwert v. Meshwert, 543
S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976) (mere opinion is some evidence, but
whether it is insufficient evidence is for lower court), aff'd, 549 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1977).
106. Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1990); CPS Int'l,
Inc. v. Harris & Westmoreland, 784 S.W.2d 538, 544 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ);
Martini v. Tatum, 776 S.W.2d 666, 668-69 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, writ denied); First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ritenour, 704 S.W.2d 895, 902 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bering Int'l, Inc. v. Greater Houston Bank, 662 S.W.2d 642, 653 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ dism'd); Bethel v. Butler Drilling Co., 635 S.W.2d 834,
839-42 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Time and labor required;
Novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
Skill requisite to do the work properly;
Preclusion of other employment;
Fee customarily charged;
Whether the fee is fixed or contingent;

7.
8.

Amount at issue and results obtained;
Time limits imposed by the client or circumstances;

9. Nature and length of relationship with the client; and
10. Experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer(s) doing the
work. 107
While each of these factors may be considered, lack of evidence on

any one factor will not defeat the claim for attorney's fees."' 8 Further, the form of proof on each factor is flexible. For example, the
first factor may be shown either by proof of the number of hours
worked or by detailed proof of the type of work performed. II However, if the claim seeks a fee higher than a lodestar figure-factor 1
multiplied by factor 4-there should be evidence establishing why the
other factors justify a higher award. 110 Otherwise the court may limit
the award to the lodestar amount."1 '

While one factor to be considered is the result obtained at trial, an
award of attorney's fees need not correspond directly to the verdict.
In fact, it may far exceed all other damages. 12 For example, in Flint
107. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 1.04 (Vernon Supp. 1992); Transamerican Natural Gas
Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 921 n.3 (Tex. 1991) (Gonzalez, J., concurring) (mentioning
all factors except 4 and 9); Rosas v. Bursey, 724 S.W.2d 402, 410-11 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1986, no writ) (mentioning factors 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10); First Nat'l Bank of Mercedes v. La Sara
Grain Co., 676 S.W.2d 183, 184-85 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) (discussing
factors which determine reasonableness); Knopf v. Standard Fixtures Co., Inc., 581 S.W.2d
504, 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ); Hemphill v. S & Q Clothiers, 579
S.W.2d 564, 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ); Braswell v. Braswell, 476
S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ dism'd) (mentioning factors 1, 2, 4, 6, 7,
and 9); cf Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at 881 (setting out somewhat different list of factors).
108. City of Amarillo v. Langley, 651 S.W.2d 906, 915-16 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983,
no writ).
109. Hugh Wood Ford, Inc. v. Galloway, 830 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.); Brighton Homes, Inc. v. McAdams, 737 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Maintain, Inc. v. Maxson-Mahoney-Turner, Inc. 698 S.W.2d 469, 473 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
110. Tuthill v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 614 S.W.2d 205, 212-16 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Ill. Bradbury v. Scott, 788 S.W.2d 31, 40 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ
denied).
112. See, e.g., Hruska v. First State Bank of Deanville, 747 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. 1988)
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& Ass'n v. Intercontinental Pipe & Steel,21 3 the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a $160,000 fee was reasonable, although the plaintiff
recovered only $24,000 in damages. Judge Hecht pointed out that the
defendants had counterclaimed for $525,000, and "having picked the
game and set the stakes, cannot now complain of the size of the
pot. 1" 4 However, the courts will reduce an excessive fee award by
remittitur. One of the most frequent grounds for doing so is an award
of fees that is substantially higher than the verdict." 5
Additional evidence is necessary if the fee claim includes work done
by paralegals or legal assistants. Such fees are recoverable along with
attorney's fees only if there is proof of the following:
1. The paralegal's qualifications to perform substantive legal work;
2. The direction and supervision of the paralegal's work by an
attorney;
3. The nature of the work done;
4. The hourly rate charged for the legal assistant; and
5. The number of hours worked."16
Without such proof, paralegal fees are not recoverable." 7 Of course,
these requirements can be waived if there are no objections to the
evidence or no request for a limiting jury instruction."I
Billing and time records may be introduced as business records in
support of an attorney's fees claim." 9 Yet, there are several good reasons for not introducing these records. In the first place, the effort is
(finding $12,500 fee reasonable to recover $2,900 damages); Trice v. State, 712 S.W.2d 842,
851 (Tex. App.-Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (determining $46,000 fee reasonable to award in

winning $79.25 and injunction); Stuckey v. White, 647 S.W.2d 35, 38-39 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1982, no writ) (awarding $33,000 fee to recover $14,399).
113. 739 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied).
114. Id. at 626.
115. See Jack Roach Ford v. De Urdanavia, 659 S.W.2d 725, 730 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1983, no writ) (finding $28,500 fee excessive by $8,500 where recovery equaled
$500); Wuagneux Builders, Inc. v. Candlewood Builders, Inc., 651 S.W.2d 919, 923 (Tex.
App,-Fort Worth 1983, no writ) (stating that $15,500 fee excessive where recovery only
$5,635); Allied Fin. Co. v. Garza, 626 S.W.2d 120, 126-28 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1981,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) ($14,768 fee excessive by $7,000 where recovery only $682.34).
116. Gill Sav. Ass'n v. International Supply Co., 759 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
117. Moody v. EMC Servs., Inc., 828 S.W.2d 237, 248 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]

1992, n.w.h.).
118. Multi-Moto Corp. v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 806 S.W.2d 560, 571 (Tex.

App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
119. See TEx. R. Civ. EVID. 803(6) (stating criteria for introducing business records).
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unnecessary; billing records do not have to be introduced to support a
fee recovery.1 20 An expert witness may testify from a review or summary of the records without introducing the records at trial. 2 1 Additionally, the billing records often contain either privileged information
or specific items that will provide ammunition for cross-examination.
Further, if the bills are admitted, the judgment may be limited to the
22
amount indicated by the bills unless any difference is explained.
B.

Defendant's Case

Parties defending against attorney's fee claims often hesitate to introduce evidence concerning a reasonable fee for the claimant, fearing
that a jury might interpret these actions as an admission of the truth
of the underlying claim. Nevertheless, there are several valid reasons
for offering defense evidence. Judges and jurors may be more willing
to cut attorney's fees if they have some evidentiary basis for doing so.
If attorney's fees are not recoverable on all claims, the defendant must
introduce evidence concerning the unrecoverable fees 123 and must petition to reduce any award accordingly.1 24 An award of little or no
attorney's fees will be reversed for legal or factual insufficiency unless
25
there is evidence that the award is reasonable.
120. See Murrco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600, 606 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990,
no writ) (finding that expert testimony could constitute necessary staff overhead).
121. Id.; Liptak v. Pensabene, 736 S.W.2d 953, 957-58 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ);
Rotello v. Ring Around Prods., Inc., 614 S.W.2d 455, 462-63 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
122. American Baler Co. v. SRS Sys., 748 S.W.2d 243, 260 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st
Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
123. See, e.g., Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Tex. 1991); Moody
v. EMC Servs., Inc., 828 S.W.2d 237, 248 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.).
124. See, e.g., Coleman v. Rotana, 778 S.W.2d 867, 874 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ
denied); Plains Ins. Co. v. Evans, 692 S.W.2d 952, 957 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no
writ).
125. See Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1990) (supporting evidence should be free of contradictions); Satellite Earth Stations East, Inc. v. Davis,
756 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, writ denied) (determining that jury decides
reasonable fees); Jess v. Libson, 742 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ) (remanding after jury awarded $1.00 against great weight of contradictory evidence); Great State
Petroleum v. Arrow Rig Serv., 706 S.W.2d 803, 811-12 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth) (upholding
jury award due to expert's testimony), modified, 714 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1986); Ambox, Inc. v.
Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc., 518 S.W.2d 428, 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (remanding because great weight of evidence against awarding nominal
damages); cf Tarleton State Univ. v. K.A. Sparks Contractor, Inc., 695 S.W.2d 362, 366 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (sustaining $0 award against no evidence point because
some evidence that $12,000 requested was excessive).
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The evidence to be introduced by the party potentially liable for
attorney's fees generally follows the same rules applicable to the
claimant. The Disciplinary Rule factors for setting a reasonable fee
may be used to suggest a reduced fee.126 For example, a fee may be
cut based upon evidence that the case was overprepared, overtried, or
overbriefed. 21 If the claimant's counsel has argued throughout trial
that the issues in the case are clear, the defense can argue that the fee
award should be small because the case involved no difficult questions. Inflation of the plaintiff's underlying claim at trial is likely to
call for a limited fee.
Evidence that the attorney's work was poor or that excessive work
was necessary because of discovery abuse may be admissible. 12 1 It is
unclear how far a party can go in presenting evidence about pretrial
discovery disputes. For example, although proof that the court has
struck certain claims is normally inadmissible, 29 it is relevant if the
fee award sought includes work on such claims. A case by case determination probably must be made as to whether the probative value of
such evidence is substantially outweighed by the prejudice
involved. 130
To a jury member, the skill necessary to represent one of the parties
deserves no more than the wages paid to a teacher or salesperson.
Few jurors make anywhere near the $100 to $200 per hour often
claimed as reasonable fees. They may be sympathetic to testimony
that the attorney deserves much less than the customary hourly rate.
Defense evidence that a claimant's fee claim is inflated may fit nicely
with a general defensive position that all claims in the case are
exaggerated.
Evidence regarding the claimant's time sheets and bills should be
used only if the propositions they support were established during
126.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

DR 2-106(B) (1980) (listing fac-

tors for determining fee).
127. See, e.g., Cohen v. Sims, 830 S.W.2d 285, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1992, n.w.h.) (stating total number of hours unreasonable due to lack of extenuating circumstances); Allied Fin. Co. v. Garza, 626 S.W.2d 120, 127 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (reasoning complexities resolved in first appeal should not increase attorney's fees
calculated on remand).
128. CPS Int'l, Inc. v. Harris & Westmoreland, 784 S.W.2d 538, 544 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ).
129. See Haynes v. State, 727 S.W.2d 294, 297 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no
pet.) (providing that collateral evidence may be excluded).
130. TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 403.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol24/iss2/1

20

Brister: Proof of Attorney's Fees in Texas.

1993]

PROOF OF A TTORNEY'S FEES

pretrial discovery. Counsel should avoid asking on cross-examination
whether the opposing attorney brought these records. This is an improper request for production, especially if the purpose is to suggest
to the jury that the witness is concealing information. Additionally,
even if the records are produced, they are of limited use without prior
discovery and review.
C.

Chapter 38 Cases to Court

Under Chapter 38, if a case is tried by the court, the judge may take
judicial notice of (1) the contents of the file to estimate the work involved, and (2) the customary fee for the claim involved, which is
presumed to be reasonable. 132 As a result, a judge may find a reasonable attorney's fee without any offer of evidence. 133 The judge may do
so without any request for judicial notice134 and without any indica135
tion in the record that judicial notice was taken.
The practical effect of this judicial notice provision is to make it
very unlikely that a judge's award of attorney's fees will be reversed
for no evidence, unless the award is completely nonsensical.1 36 A tactical advantage of the provision is that it may preserve a fee award
when the claimant has failed timely to designate an expert witness.
No expert testimony means no recovery in a jury trial. But by waiving the jury, the claimant may state the fees paid-a
factual matter137
rest.
the
provide
to
notice
and rely upon judicial
This does not mean the claimant should forego offering any evi131. See City of San Antonio v. Vela, 762 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1988, writ denied) (holding oral motion for production evidence improper when written motion never filed, served on opposing counsel, or ruled on by court); Mortgage Co. of Am. v.
McCord, 466 S.W.2d 868, 872-73 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
132. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 38.003-.004 (Vernon 1986).

133. Coward v. Gateway Nat'l Bank of Beaumont, 525 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tex. 1975);
Bloom v. Bloom, 767 S.W.2d 463, 471-72 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied); Flint
& Assoc. v. Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, 739 S.W.2d 622, 626 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ
denied); Ho v. Wolfe, 688 S.W.2d 693, 697-98 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ).
134. Holsworth v. Czeschin, 632 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no
writ).
135. See Lacy v. First Nat'l Bank of Livingston, 809 S.W.2d 362, 367 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, n.w.h.) (presuming that judicial notice was taken).
136. Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex. 1990) (holding
that award of $150 was abuse of discretion in light of clear and uncontradicted evidence of
$22,500 in attorney's fees).
137. Lacy, 809 S.W.2d at 366-68.
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dence of fees at a bench trial. As the Texas Supreme Court recognized over 100 years ago, the amount awarded by a trial judge
without evidence "is likely to be less than that established by the testimony of the experts .. ."'38 The court's file may reflect little of the
work actually completed. If the reasons for a sizable fee are not
clearly explained, the court may assume the case
was overworked
39
even if the claimant's proof is uncontradicted.
It is unclear whether the judicial notice provisions of Chapter 38
apply to bench trials under other statutes. The language of Section
38.004 makes no explicit limitation to Chapter 38 claims, and the section has been used in property tax,' 4° turnover, 41 and insurance code
proceedings.142 However, some courts have held judicial notice inapplicable to garnishment,' 43 Family Code,'" and DTPA proceedings. 145 One court has held that judicial notice may be taken of a
proper demand letter, at least if the demand letter is in the court's
file. 146
138. Johnson Co. v. Blanks, Walker & Co., 68 Tex. 495, 497, 4 S.W. 557, 558 (1887).
139. See Armstrong Forest Prods. v. Redempco, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 446, 451-53 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied) (holding court justified in awarding only $7,500 in attorney's fees despite uncontroverted testimony of $23,000 in fees earned); Inwood North Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Wilkes, 813 S.W.2d 156, 157 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991,
n.w.h.) (awarding $500 rather than $1,486 in fees requested although amount earned was not
disputed).
140. Atascosa County Appraisal Dist. v. Tymrak, 815 S.W.2d 364, 371 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1991, n.w.h.); but cf. City of Houston v. First City, Tex., 827 S.W.2d 462, 476 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.).
141. Ross v. 3D Tower Ltd., 824 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1992, n.w.h.); Carlyle Real Estate Ltd. Partnership-X v. Leibman, 782 S.W.2d 230, 233 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
142. General Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Higginbotham, 817 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
143. Bullock v. Foster Cathead Co., 631 S.W.2d 208, 212 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1982, no writ).
144. Underhill v. Underhill, 614 S.W.2d 178, 181-82 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
145. Coward, 525 S.W.2d at 858-59; Leggett v. Brinson, 817 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1991, n.w.h.); Hoelscher v. GFH Fin. Servs., 814 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1991, n.w.h.); Nelson v. Schanzer, 788 S.W.2d 81, 88 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Smith v. Smith, 757 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988,
writ denied); see Kaiser v. Northwest Shopping Ctr., Inc., 544 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (stating that evidence of reasonable attorney's fees required unless suit is brought under Article 2226). However, it appears that at least one justice of the
Texas Supreme Court might hold otherwise as to the DTPA. Smith, 757 S.W.2d at 428
(Hecht, J., dissenting).
146. Carrington v. Hart, 703 S.W.2d 814, 817-18 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol24/iss2/1

22

Brister: Proof of Attorney's Fees in Texas.

1993]

PROOF OF A 7TORNEY'S FEES

D. ContractualStipulation of Fees
Because Chapter 38 provides for recovery of attorney's fees in contract cases, the contract itself need not specify the recovery. 47 However, many contracts do provide that if an attorney is retained for
collection, a set percentage of the outstanding balance is reasonable as
attorney's fees. A party relying on this type of provision must intro48
duce it into evidence.1
Once introduced, recovery under a contractual stipulation is not so
absolute as the language might suggest. In FR. Hernandez Construction & Supply Co. v. NationalBank of Commerce of Brownsville,'49 the
Texas Supreme Court stated:
Texas courts do not regard agreements to pay attorney's fees based on a
percentage of the unpaid balance and interest on a promissory note as
absolute promises to pay the contractual amount, but as contracts to
indemnify the holder of the note for attorney's expenses actually in150
curred in collecting the principal and interest on the note.
Thus, if the fee actually incurred is less than the contractual stipulation, recovery may be limited to this amount.' 5 '
A contractual stipulation does alter the burden of proof in a fee
case. Introducing the contractual provision establishes a prima facie
case that the stipulated amount is reasonable and recoverable. 5 2 The
burden then shifts to the opposing party to plead, prove, and request
an issue on an affirmative defense that: (1) the contractual amount is
unreasonable, and (2) a particular lower amount would be reasonable. 53 If the opposing party does not plead and prove a lower
amount as a reasonable fee, the stipulated fee is recoverable without
147. First City Bank v. Guex, 677 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Tex. 1984).
148. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Nations, 654 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
149. 578 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. 1979).
150. Id. at 676.
151. Rosestone Properties, Inc. v. Schliemann, 662 S.W.2d 49, 54 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
152. Scalise v. McCallum, 700 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Rosestone, 662 S.W.2d at 54; Spring Branch Bank v. Mengden, 628 S.W.2d 130, 134
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
153. FR. Hernandez Constr. & Supply Co., 578 S.W.2d at 677; Kuper v. Schmidt, 161
Tex. 189, 191, 338 S.W.2d 948, 950 (1960); Cooper v. Supercinski, 700 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Long v. Tascosa Nat'l Bank of Amarillo, 678 S.W.2d
699, 706-07 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ).
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any proof that an attorney has been hired or paid.1 54 However, even if
the defendant does not establish this affirmative defense, the trier of
fact still may award less than the amount provided in the note. 55
These general rules may vary depending upon the language of the
contract at issue. For example, a clause providing for a fee that is
"not more than" or "not less than" a stated percentage allows for a
range of fees. Thus, this clause may not carry the same presumptions
that accompany a fixed-fee clause. 5 6 If the contract merely provides
for payment of attorney's fees incurred, this amount is prima facie
recoverable and the reasonableness of the award becomes an affirmative defense. 57
A guaranty that provides for a stipulated percentage as attorney's
fees is governed generally by the same rules as any other contract.158
However, as the terms of a guaranty limit a guarantor's liability, a
guaranty that requires payment of "reasonable attorney's fee" limits
a provision in an underlying note for a set percentage, and evidence of
a reasonable fee must be introduced. 59
While Texas law clearly allows a fee award smaller than the
stipulated percentage in a contract, there is some question whether it
can be larger. Some courts hold that a contractually stipulated
percentage acts as a recovery ceiling"6 while a few others suggest the
154. Kuper, 161 Tex. at 189, 338 S.W.2d at 950; Evans v. Evans, 766 S.W.2d 356, 357
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ); Loomis v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 653 S.W.2d
75, 79 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
155. Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex. 1990); National
Mar-Kit, Inc. v. Forrest, 687 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no
writ); Payne v. Snyder, 661 S.W.2d 134, 143 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
156. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Arkla Equip. Co., 528 S.W.2d 568, 570
(Tex. 1975); Yandell v. Tarrant State Bank, 538 S.W.2d 684, 688-90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1976), aff'd, 561 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1978); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank of Hereford, 474
S.W.2d 785, 787-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
157. Durkin v. American Gen. Fire & Cas. Co., 651 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
158. Spillman v. Self-Serv. Fixture Co., Inc., 693 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
159. Pentad Joint Venture v. First Nat'l Bank of La Grange, 797 S.W.2d 92, 99 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1990, writ denied); Simpson v. MBank Dallas, 724 S.W.2d 102, 110-11 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Houston Furniture Distrib. Inc. v. Bank of Woodlake,
N.A., 562 S.W.2d 880, 884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
160. Stokley v. Hanratty, 809 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991,
n.w.h.); Coastal Shutters & Insulation, Inc. v. Derr, 809 S.W.2d 916, 923 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.); Beltran v. Groos Bank, N.A., 755 S.W.2d 944, 950-51 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ); Lifemark Corp. v. Merritt, 655 S.W.2d 310, 319 (Tex.
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contrary. 6 ' Treating the contractual stipulation as a ceiling appears
to conflict with the principle stated in Hernandez.6 z Under Hernandez, the attorney's fees stipulation is interpreted as a promise to
pay fees actually incurred. Fees incurred may be above as well as
below the contractual stipulation. When considering whether an
award can be less than the prescribed percentage, the courts uniformly treat the clause as a burden-shifting mechanism rather than an
absolute floor to recovery. 163 When considering whether an award
can be greater than the prescribed percentage, the stipulation should
still be treated as a burden of proof mechanism rather than an absolute ceiling to recovery.
E. Appellate Fees
Generally, the usual proof rules apply to proof of appellate fees.
There must be a statute or contract allowing appellate fees, but a general provision for "attorney's fees" will include appellate fees.16 4
There must be evidence in the record to support an appellate fee
award. If there is no such evidence or merely some evidence, any
award will be reversed or limited to the amount supported by the
65
evidence.
As with trial fees, there is an exception for Chapter 38 cases. In a
Chapter 38 case tried to the court, appellate fees can be established by
judicial notice without other proof appearing in the record. 66 HowApp.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Cheney v. Parks, 605 S.W.2d 640, 643
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
161. See Richardson v. Office Bldgs. of Houston, 704 S.W.2d 373, 376-77 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ) (upholding higher percentage because no statement of
facts on appeal); Lifemark Corp., 655 S.W.2d at 319 (barring higher percentage where claimant already recovered more than contractual percentage); Chiles v. Becker, 608 S.W.2d 816,
818-19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (barring Article 2226 claim only because not
pled).
162. Stokley, 809 S.W.2d at 927; Derr, 809 S.W.2d at 923 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
163. FR. Hernandez Constr. & Supply Co., 578 S.W.2d at 677.
164. International Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. 1971).
165. Valley Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Molina, 818 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1991, writ denied); City of Dallas v. Arnett, 762 S.W.2d 942, 958 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, writ denied); Delhi Gas Corp. v. Lamb, 724 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Siegler v. Williams, 658 S.W.2d 236, 241 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1983, no writ); Chrysler Corp. v. Schuenemann, 618 S.W.2d 799, 807 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
166. Gill Say. Ass'n v. Chair King, 797 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Tex. 1990); Bethel v. Norman
Furniture Co., Inc., 756 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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ever, judicial notice must be taken by the trial court, not an appellate
court. 67
'
Although the general rules are the same, appellate fees present special problems at trial because they are a future contingency.' 68 Except
for the penalty for frivolous appeals,1 69 appellate fees must be determined at the trial court level. 7° At the time of trial, the nature and
extent of any appeal is unknown. Thus, the form of proof must be
altered to reflect these contingencies.
A conclusory opinion stating a particular amount as a reasonable
appellate fee may be sufficient proof to support an appellate fee
award.' 7 ' The safer practice, though, is to support this opinion with
an estimate of the work that will be needed and a reasonable rate for
such work. 7 2 Contingency fee awards providing for an additional
percentage to cover appeals have also been upheld. 73
F.

Summary Proceedings

The general rules of proof apply to an award of attorney's fees in
connection with a default or summary judgment. A judgment for attorney's fees in summary proceedings must be supported by evidence. 7 4 Where demand is a prerequisite, failure to plead and prove
167. Pelto Oil Co. v. CSK Oil & Gas Corp., 804 S.W.2d 583, 588 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Superior Ironworks, Inc. v. Roll Form Prods., Inc., 789 S.W.2d
430, 431 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1990 no writ).
168. Where a party entitled to attorney's fees is successful after appeal and remand, appellate fees to date would be a known quantity, and recoverable as such. Uvalde County Appraisal Dist. v. F.T. Kincaid Estate, 720 S.W.2d 678, 682 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
169. TEX. R. App. P. 84; McGuire v. Post Oak Lane Townhome Owners Ass'n, 794
S.W.2d 66, 69 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
170. InternationalSec. Life Ins. Co., 468 S.W.2d at 349.
171. Bradbury v. Scott, 788 S.W.2d 31, 40 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1989, writ
denied); Centroplex Ford, Inc. v. Kirby, 736 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no
writ); Chrysler-Plymouth City, Inc. v. Guerrero, 620 S.W.2d 700, 706-07 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1981, no writ).
172. Smith v. Smith, 757 S.W.2d 422, 425-26 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied);
Pleasant Hills Children's Home of the Assemblies of God, Inc. v. Nida, 596 S.W.2d 947, 953
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
173. Bernal v. Garrison, 818 S.W.2d 79, 85 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied); Hochheim Prairie Farm Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Burnett, 698 S.W.2d 271, 278 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
174. Thompson v. A.G. Nash & Co., 704 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no
writ); Blumenthal v. Ameritex Computer Corp., 646 S.W.2d 283, 287-88 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, no writ).
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demand requires reversal and remand of summary proceedings.175
In a motion for summary judgment, the movant must both plead
and prove attorney's fees as a matter of law. 176 An attorney's affidavit
is sufficient to support an attorney's fees award in a summary judgment case unless the affidavit is controverted. 177 If there is no controverting affidavit, the court must grant the full amount of the fee
requested. 178 Without an affidavit by either party, the court still may
grant fees on summary judgment under the judicial notice provisions
of Chapter 38179 or on a contract containing a stipulated percentage
80

fee. 1

However, a controverting affidavit, even if it is only conclusory,
1 81
creates a fact issue, thus rendering summary judgment improper.
If a controverting affidavit is filed, the judicial notice provisions of
Chapter 38 do not apply 182 because judicial notice may provide evidence but cannot resolve conflicting evidence. 183 A controverting affi-

175. Nettles v. Del Lingco of Houston, 638 S.W.2d 633, 635-36 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1982, no writ).
176. See Birdwell v. Birdwell, 819 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no
writ) (stating motion for summary judgment must plead attorney's fees separately from prayer
for general relief).
177. See, e.g., Owen Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Brite Day Constr., Inc., 821 S.W.2d 283, 288
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (filing affidavit by contesting party insufficient if attorney's fees controverted); Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Coastal Ref. & Mktg., Inc.,
754 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (stating attorney's
affidavit in absence of controverting evidence sufficient to support summary judgment);
Querner Truck Lines, Inc. v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 747 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1988, no writ) (stating that attorney's affidavit can establish reasonable attorney's
fees).
178. See American 10-Minute Oil Change, Inc. v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 783 S.W.2d
598, 602 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ) (stating trial court has option to grant full amount
or zero amount of attorney's fees).
179. Superior Ironworks, Inc. v. Roll Form Prods., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ); Cloughly v. NBC Bank-Seguin, 773 S.W.2d 652,
657 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
180. Kuper v. Schmidt, 338 S.W.2d 948, 950-51 (Tex. 1960); Houston Furniture Distrib.,
Inc. v. Bank of Woodlake, 562 S.W.2d 880, 884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no
writ).
181. Nguyen Ngoc Giao v. Smith & Lamm, P.C., 714 S.W.2d 144, 148-49 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); Engel v. Pettit, 713 S.W.2d 770, 772-73 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ); Gifford v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 613 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
182. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 754 S.W.2d at 767.
183. See Bethel v. Butler Drilling Co., 635 S.W.2d 834, 841 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that judicially noticed fee is not mandatory).
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davit by a non-attorney does not create a material fact issue. 18 4

While normally attorney's fees cannot be awarded upon summary
judgment if there is a fact issue, an exception applies to declaratory
judgment actions. Because attorney's fees in this area are left to the
discretion of the court, the trial judge may award such attorney's fees
18 5
following summary judgment.
In default judgments, a reasonable attorney's fee is an unliquidated
claim18 6 requiring proof either by testimony or affidavit. 1s7 Again, an

exception exists in Chapter 38 cases where judicial notice alone can
support a default award of attorney's fees absent any contrary evidence in the record. 18s Assuming there is some evidence of attorney's
fees upon default, the court need not award exactly the amount re-

quested by uncontradicted evidence. 1 9 In Ragsdale v. Progressive
Voters League, 9 0 the Texas Supreme Court stated that in default
judgment situations, even if the evidence is clear, direct, positive, and
uncontradicted, "the trial judge could find some of the claimed fees to
be unreasonable, unwarranted, or some other circumstance that
would make an award of the uncontroverted claim wrong." 19 ' Thus,
the court can award less than the amount requested by looking to the
contents of the court's file, the amount in controversy, and the extent
192
to which the proceedings were uncontested.
G. Sanctions
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure require attorney's fees awarded

184. See Querner Truck Lines, Inc., 747 S.W.2d at 469 (finding no issue as to material
fact concerning attorney's fees).
185. Elder v. Bro, 809 S.w.2d 799, 801 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ
denied); Ritchie v. City of Fort Worth, 730 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
186. Wall v. Wall, 630 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
187. Siddiqui v. West Bellfort Property Owners Ass'n, 819 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Tex. App.El Paso 1991, no writ); Blumenthal, 646 S.W.2d at 287-88.
188. Bloom v. Bloom, 767 S.W.2d 463, 471-72 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ
denied).
189. Inwood North Homeowners' Ass'n v. Wilkes, 813 S.W.2d 156, 157-58 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ); Bethel, 635 S.w.2d at 841-42.
190. 801 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam).
191. Id. at 882.
192. Fonmeadow Property Owners' Ass'n v. Franklin, 817 S.W.2d 104, 105-06 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ); Inwood North Homeowners' Ass'n, 813 S.W.2d at
157-58.
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as sanctions to be "reasonable." 19 3 Current law on sanctions also re1 94
quires that a fee award bear some relationship to the harm asserted.
Further, if the fee is ordered to be paid before judgment, the award
cannot preclude continuance of the litigation.195
There is wide variance in practice as to the need for and nature of
evidence in the record to support these fee sanctions. Some courts
require no evidence to support an attorney's fee sanction, 96 while
others consider oral testimony, 97 affidavits, 19 and judicial notice.' 99
An unsworn statement by counsel during argument has been held sufficient, 2°° and insufficient, 2"' to support a sanctions fee award.
Further, the rules provide that such fees can only be awarded after
a hearing.20 2 However, it is unclear what procedures should govern
this hearing. There is no right to a jury because the amount of the fee
sanction rests in the court's discretion.20 3 Requiring oral testimony
and cross-examination in all cases is infeasible given the volume of
sanctions litigation. Affidavits and judicial notice would be much less
time-consuming and would not significantly sacrifice fairness, at least
in cases where the fees requested are not substantial.
H.

Ad Litem Fees

Fees awarded for an attorney or guardian ad litem differ in several
respects from other provisions for attorney's fees. Ad litem fees are
193. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215.
194. Transamerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991).
195. Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 930 (Tex. 1991); Glass v. Glass, 826 S.W.2d

683, 688 n.9 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ).
196. Allied Assocs., Inc. v. INA County Mut. Ins. Cos., 803 S.W.2d 799, 799 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
197. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Rogers, 818 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, no
writ); Schaver v. British Am. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, no
writ).
198. Goad v. Goad, 768 S.W.2d 356, 359 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990).
199. Vaughn v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 792 S.W.2d 139, 144 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
200. See Hanley v. Hanley, 813 S.W.2d 511, 523 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) (reversing award in excess of such argument); Powers v. Palacios, 771 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) (holding that objection required if court waived
oath).
201. Vaughn, 792 S.W.2d at 144.
202. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(1)(d), 2(b), (3).
203. Brantley v. Etter, 677 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam).
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taxed as part of the costs of the proceeding 2° and consequently are
normally recoverable from the losing party.2 °5 However, an ad litem's work is not just for the client's benefit but is also to some extent
for the benefit of the parties and the court. Without an ad litem, finality of judgment would not be possible as to minors, parties served by
publication, or others. Thus, for good cause shown in the record, ad
litem fees may be assessed against the party who wins the litigation.20 6
An ad litem fee for appeal may also be awarded regardless of
success.

20 7

The amount of a guardian ad litem fee is a matter for the court's
discretion.20 ' However, this discretion is not unbridled. The judge
must consider the same factors used to set an appropriate attorney's
fee in other cases.20 9 Most courts have held that there is no need for
evidence in the record to support an ad litem fee,2 10 though the lack of
a record precludes appellate review. l1 Other courts, however, have
held that such evidence is preferable, 2 12 or even required, 213 and may
not be supplied by judicial notice.21 4
V.

A.

THE SEGREGATION ISSUE

General Case

One of the thorniest and most frequently litigated issues involved in
proof of attorney's fees concerns segregation of recoverable fees.
Although many claims and parties may be joined in one action, fees

204. TEX. R. Civ. P. 173, 244.

205. TEX. R. Civ. P. 131.
206. See Rhodes v. Cahill, 802 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. 1990) (assessing fees for attorney
ad litem); Rogers v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex. 1985) (assessing fees for
attorney ad litem).
207. Cahill v. Lyda, 826 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam).
208. Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., Inc., 739 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. 1987).
209. Id.; Valley Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Molina, 818 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
210. Dover Elevator Co. v. Servellon, 812 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no
writ); Alford v. Whaley, 794 S.W.2d 920, 924-25 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no
writ); Transport Ins. Co. v. Liggins, 625 S.W.2d 780, 785 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
211. Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., Inc., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987).
212. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Welch, 702 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
213. Brown & Root U.S.A., Inc. v. Trevino, 802 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1990, no writ).
214. Id. at 15.
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may be recoverable only as to some, rendering recoverable only a part
of the total attorney's fees incurred. Generally, a party seeking attorney's fees in such situations bears the burden of segregating work attributable to claims 21 5' and parties 21 6 as to which fees are recoverable.
Segregated fees can be proved in one of two ways. The court can
admit only the evidence concerning the hours worked on recoverable
claims and the segregated lodestar figure. Alternatively, a party can
first prove a total fee on a case and then estimate the portion of the fee
attributable to recoverable work. For example, testimony that 40%
of a total fee is attributable to a recoverable claim is sufficient to support a jury award.2 17 The evidence regarding work attributable to
segregated claims may be a rough estimate; an exact accounting of
every minute of time spent is not required. 8
Some courts erroneously hold that the judicial notice provisions of
Chapter 38 are inapplicable to segregation of fees.2 19 If a court can
use the file and judicial experience to determine a fee on a recoverable
claim alone, there is no reason to think this method is inappropriate
merely because the file includes nonrecoverable claims.
The rule requiring segregation has several exceptions. First, if the
time spent on nonrecoverable claims is nominal, segregation is not
required.2 2 ° Courts may look for any separate evidence or jury question on nonrecoverable claims in deciding whether the work on these
221
claims was nominal.
Second, Texas courts do not require segregation of fees if the claims
are so intertwined that it is impossible to determine which part of the
215. Matthews v. Candlewood Builders, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. 1985).
216. Home Say. Ass'n v. Guerra, 733 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tex. 1987); Bray v. Curtis, 544
S.W.2d 816, 819-20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
217. Schenck v. Ebby Halliday Real Estate, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1990, no writ); accord Bradbury v. Scott, 788 S.W.2d 31, 40 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (affirming fee award on testimony that 75% of total fees were attributable to recoverable claims).
218. See Stine v. Marathon Oil Co., 753 F. Supp. 202, 204 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (arguing that
work of attorney cannot be quantified).
219. Nelson v. Schanzer, 788 S.W.2d 81, 88 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ
denied).
220. Bullock v. Kehoe, 678 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 323 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1982, no writ) (considering less than 10% of total time nominal); see also Creative Mfg.,
Inc. v. Unik, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 207, 210-11 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(calculating time allotted for work and claim presented).
221. Bullock, 678 S.W.2d at 560.
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attorney's work is attributable to the nonrecoverable claim. 222 This is
a corollary to the exception for nominal nonrecoverable work; if
claims are very similar, then the work attributable solely to
nonrecoverable matters would be slight. However, as discussed below, there is much uncertainty as to what claims meet this exception.
Even if segregation is required, it may be and frequently is
waived. 223 For example, the jury question on attorney's fees ought to
be limited to recoverable claims and parties.22 4 However, if a party
fails to object on this ground, any error is waived and an award for
the total fees will be upheld. 225 Further, the objection must be specific; a general objection that does not mention segregation is insufficient.22 6 Similarly, in a bench trial if there is no postjudgment
objection to an unsegregated fee award, error is waived.22 7
For some years, it was unclear whether a party was required to
object to unsegregated attorney's fees at the time the evidence itself
was offered. Both appellate courts in Houston required parties to object when the evidence was offered. 2 28 Thus, objection was necessary
every time unsegregated bills, time summaries, or expert testimony
was offered.22 9 However, in Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling,2 a°
the Texas Supreme Court held that an objection at the jury charge
stage to a question that did not segregate fees preserved error even
though no one objected to the evidence when it was offered. 231 This
rule is sound because the total fees in a case are some evidence of the

222. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Tex. 1991).
223. Home Say. Ass'n, 733 S.W.2d at 137; Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co., 699
S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1985); Matthews, 685 S.W.2d at 650.
224. International Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Finck, 496 S.W.2d 544, 546-47 (Tex. 1973).
225. Hruska v. First State Bank of Deanville, 747 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. 1988); Aero
Energy, Inc., 699 S.W.2d at 823; Matthews, 685 S.W.2d at 650; cf Canales v. Zapatero, 773
S.W.2d 659, 661-62 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied) (stating that no objection
necessary if claimant's pleadings obscured need to do so).
226. Morey v. Page, 802 S.W.2d 779, 785 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
227. Southern Concrete Co. v. Metrotec Fin., Inc., 775 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex. App.Dallas 1989, no writ).
228. Stewart Tile Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 772 S.W.2d 242, 248-49 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1989), rev'd, 822 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1991); Osoba v. Bassichis, 679 S.W.2d 119, 123
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Houts v. Barton, 657 S.W.2d 924,
926-27 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
229. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 772 S.W.2d at 248-49; Osoba, 679 S.W.2d at 123; Houts,
657 S.W.2d at 926-27.
230. 822 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1991).
231. Id. at 12.
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amount of the segregated fee. Also, this rule will work to avoid repetitious objections.
B.

Intertwined Claims

There is no universal standard for determining which claims are
sufficiently intertwined to avoid the need for segregation. Because the
possible combinations of claims and parties approach infinity, determination must be made case by case. The following analysis of some
categories of the claims that courts have considered may give some
guidance as to how similar claims will be treated.
1. Multiple Claims Against One Party
Generally, a party must segregate work on different claims because
the elements and facts to be proved in the causes of action differ.
Thus, segregation is required between claims on separate contracts.23 2
Segregation is also required between a claim for declaratory judgment
as to ownership of a car and a claim for negligence in constructing the
underlying draft to purchase the car.233 However, even when the specific elements to be proved differ; some courts hold that because the
same facts are involved, no segregation is required. Thus, breach of
contract and quantum meruit claims require no segregation.2 34 A
party need not segregate claims for breach of contract and interference with contractual relations. 235 Actions for division of property
and infliction of emotional distress in a divorce proceeding also do not
2 36
require segregation.
However, in a number of situations there is no consensus. In
claims stemming from a "broken promise," whether pled as breach of
contract, breach of warranty, fraud, misrepresentation, negligence,
breach of implied duty, breach of fiduciary duty, or violation of the

232. Grider v. Boston Co., 773 S.W.2d 338, 345 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
233. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Anderson Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 704
S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
234. Angroson, Inc. v. Independent Communications, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 268, 274 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Burditt v. Sisk, 710 S.W.2d 114, 116-17 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
235. American Nat'l Petroleum Co. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 798
S.w.2d 274, 280 (Tex. 1990).
236. Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 403-04 (Tex. App.-Houston [list Dist.] 1991,
no writ).
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DTPA, some courts have held that segregation is necessary,2 37 while
others have held that it is not.2 38 In insurance cases, some courts have
held that breach of contract, violations of the insurance code, and
DTPA claims on an insurance contract need not be segregated from
common law claims of fraud and breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing.2 39 Other courts, however, have required segregation of
breach of contract and insurance fraud claims. 2 ° In a particularly
confused area, some courts have held that segregation is necessary for
claims of slander of title and actions to remove a cloud on title.2 4'
Other courts have held that segregation is not necessary.24 2 Still other
courts have determined that attorney's fees are not recoverable for
either in any event.2 43
2.

Claims Against Multiple Parties

When identical claims are brought against a number of parties, segregation may not be necessary. Courts have held that no segregation
237. Southern Concrete Co. v. Metrotec Fin., Inc., 775 S.W.2d 446, 450-51 (Tex. App.Dallas 1989, no writ); Kosberg v. Brown, 601 S.W.2d 414, 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
238. Concorde Limousines, Inc. v. Moloney Coachbuilders, Inc., 835 F.2d 541, 546-48
(5th Cir. 1987); Nottingham v. General Am. Communications Corp., 811 F.2d 873, 880 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 854 (1987); Briercroft Serv. Corp. v. Perez, 820 S.W.2d 813, 817
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ); AmSav Group, Inc. v. American Sav. & Loan
Ass'n of Brazoria County, 796 S.W.2d 482, 492 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ
denied); Gill Say. Ass'n v. Chair King, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 674, 680-81 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1989), aff'd and modified, 797 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1990); Service Lloyds Ins. Co. v.
Greenhalgh, 771 S.W.2d 688, 695-96 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 787
S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1990); Texas Cookie Co. v. Hendricks & Peralta, Inc., 747 S.W.2d 873, 880
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied); Wilson v. Ferguson, 747 S.W.2d 499, 504
(Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied); Triland Inv. Group v. Warren, 742 S.W.2d 18, 25 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1987); rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1989); Village Mobile
Homes, Inc. v. Porter, 716 S.W.2d 543, 552 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
239. Paramount Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 772 S.W.2d 255, 266 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
240. International Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Finck, 496 S.W.2d 544, 546-47 (Tex. 1973).
241. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First Wis. Mortgage Trust, 577 S.W.2d 312,
320 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
242. See Ellis v. Waldrop, 627 S.W.2d 791, 798 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982), aff'd in
part rev'd in part on other grounds, 656 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. 1983) (holding segregation of attorney's fees not required).
243. Sadler v. Duvall, 815 S.W.2d 285, 293 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, n.w.h.); see
Ryan v. Mo-Mac Properties, 644 S.W.2d 791, 794-95 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Texas statute excluding attorney's fees in certain cases); Walker v. Ruggles,
540 S.W.2d 470, 476 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ) (allowing
recovery).
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is necessary in (1) a DTPA claim brought against a manufacturer, a
seller, and a finance company; 2 " (2) claims against a main defendant
and vicariously liable parties; 245 and (3) suits to foreclose liens against
several lot-owners.246 However, if some fees relate only to some parties, the fees may have to be segregated. Thus, segregation is necessary in an action on a construction contract against one party and to
foreclose a lien against another.247 Segregation is also required in an
action against a seller for breach of a warranty deed and an action
against the issuer of a title policy that failed to discover the title
defect.248
Again, the imprecise standards for segregation have led to disparate
holdings. One court held that a fee to foreclose a materialman's lien
against a general contractor and an owner need not be segregated,249
while another court held that an owner's action to void such a lien
against a materialman and its finance company must be segregated.25 °
3. Claims and Counterclaims by Opposing Party
The question of segregation also occurs when a party's affirmative
claim is met by a counterclaim, requiring attorney's fees for both offensive and defensive efforts. Generally, if the counterclaim seeks an
offset stemming from a totally separate occurrence, segregation is required. Thus, segregation has been required when (1) a suit on an
account is met by a counterclaim alleging breach of an entirely different contract,25 ' (2) a defendant in the main action brings a cross244. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Pierce, 768 S.W.2d 416, 425 (Tex. App.-Tyler

1989, no writ).
245. Richard Gill Co. v. Jackson's Landing Owners' Ass'n, 758 S.W.2d 921, 928-29 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
246. Roland v. General Brick Sales, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1991, n.w.h.).
247. Moody v. EMC Servs., Inc., 828 S.W.2d 237, 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1992, no writ).
248. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Tex. 1991); Stone v. Lawyers
Title Ins. Corp., 537 S.W.2d 55, 62-64 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1976), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 554 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1977).
249. See Gill Say. Ass'n v. International Supply Co., Inc., 759 S.W.2d 697, 705-06 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied) (finding segregation of fees not necessary when claims arise
out of same transaction).
250. Oxford Fin. Cos. v. Velez, 807 S.W.2d 460, 464-65 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ
denied).
251. Martco, Inc. v. Doran Chevrolet, Inc., 632 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1982, no writ).
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claim against third parties, 52 or (3) a suit to modify alimony draws a
counterclaim for alimony arrears.253 Conversely, if the counterclaim
is a mirror image of the original claim, segregation is not required.
Thus, no segregation is required if each party claims that the other
broke the contract,254 or each party claims that the other was trespassing.255 Segregation is also not required when a suit to collect on a
letter of credit is met by a counterclaim to enjoin payment of the letter
of credit. 6
The outcome is less clear if a counterclaim raises an affirmative defense. Logically, proof of different facts necessarily would be involved,
as the burden of proof of such facts is allocated differently. However,
some courts have not required segregation, reasoning that though the
claimant did not have the burden of proof, the claimant could not
have recovered on his claim without overcoming the affirmative defense. Thus, courts have held that no segregation is required when a
claim on a note or account is met by a usury counterclaim,257 a counterclaim for overcharges,25 ' a counterclaim to reform or rescind the
note, or a counterclaim that there was fraud in the inducement. 2 °
In the frequently occurring situation in which a suit on a note, contract, or account is countered by DTPA, fraud, negligence, or similar
claims asserting that the underlying goods or services were not as
252. Hill v. Pierce, 729 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Wood v. Component Constr. Corp., 722 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no
writ); but cf. Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 585 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 704 S.W.2d 742
(Tex. 1986) (requiring no segregation if third party action is merely for indemnification).
253. Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 679 S.W.2d 152, 154-55 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
254. Veale v. Rose, 657 S.W.2d 834, 841 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Wilkins v. Bain, 615 S.W.2d 314, 315-16 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ); Miller v.
Patterson, 537 S.W.2d 360, 364-65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
255. Trice v. State, 712 S.W.2d 842, 851-52 (Tex. App.-Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
256. Valdina Farms, Inc. v. Brown, Beasley & Assoc., 733 S.W.2d 688, 694 (Tex. App.-

San Antonio 1987, no writ).
257. RepublicBank Dallas, N.A. v. Shook, 653 S.W.2d 278, 282-83 (Tex. 1983); Schepps
Grocery Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 635 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1982, no writ).
258. Duval County Ranch Co. v. Alamo Lumber Co., 597 S.W.2d 528, 531 n.4 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
259. Wright v. Brooks, 773 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied); see Williamson v. Tucker, 615 S.W.2d 881, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (allowing attorney's fees award for counterclaim to reform promissory note); Damstra
v. Starr, 585 S.W.2d 817, 820-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ) (determining that
court's failure to allow counterclaim for collection of note was in error).
260. Valdina Farms, Inc., 733 S.W.2d at 694-95.
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promised, some courts have held that segregation is required,2 6 1
others have held that it is not,2 62 and at least one court has stated that
2 63
the party need not segregate the claims, but the court must.
4.

Federal Practice

In the federal courts, segregation is required if the claims involved
are "distinct in all respects."' 26 1 If the claims are related, a claimant
who has been awarded "substantial" relief need not segregate, while
one who has been awarded "only limited success" must segregate. 265
While this solution has the advantage of making the true loser pay, its
standards are just as vague and unpredictable as state law. Further,
this approach would be impractical because Texas law treats attorney's fees as a fact issue for the jury rather than as a collateral matter
usually determined by the court after the trial has been concluded and
26 6
the loser determined.
C.

Problems and ProposalsRegarding Segregation

As the above summary indicates, claimants and trial judges can
rarely predict whether an appellate court will decide that segregation
261. See Harmes v. Arklatex Corp., 615 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Tex. 1981) (reversing attorney's fees for time spent on negligence); Crow v. Central Soya Co., Inc., 651 S.W.2d 392, 396
(Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (refusing to grant attorney's fees for time
spent on DTPA claim); Bray v. Curtis, 544 S.W.2d 816, 820 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that attorney's fees are not normally recoverable).
262. See Keeper v. First Care, Inc., 794 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no
writ) (uphelding attorney's fees under DTPA); 4M Linen & Uniform Supply Co. v. W.P. Ballard & Co., 793 S.W.2d 320, 327-28 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (allowing attorney's fees award when suit on sworn account and counterclaim intertwined);
Coleman v. Rotana, 778 S.W.2d 867, 874 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied) (granting
attorney's fees arising out of same transaction); Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Russo
Properties, Inc., 710 S.w.2d 711, 715 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ) (holding
that recovering fees depends on reasonableness); De La Fuente v. Home Say. Ass'n, 669
S.W.2d 137, 145-46 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) (upholding all intertwined
fees); Building Concepts, Inc. v. Duncan, 667 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (ruling that separating not necessary with closely linked claims);
First Wichita Nat'l Bank v. Wood, 632 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no
writ) (stating that some attorney's fees are inseparable); Ortiz v. O.J. Beck & Sons, Inc., 611
S.W.2d 860, 866 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (allowing aggregate attorney's fees of two claims).
263. Flint & Assocs. v. Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, 739 S.W.2d 622, 625-26 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied).
264. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983).
265. Id.
266. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment, 455 U.S. 445, 451 (1982).
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is necessary in any particular case. Further, the natural hesitancy of
appellate courts to require a case to be tried a second time may mean
that past cases are poor predictors of future results. For example, in
cases claiming both breach of contract and fraud, the Dallas Court of
Appeals has affirmed findings by one trial judge that such claims were
intertwined267 and by another trial judge that they were not.268
Additionally, in Stewart Title Guaranty Co., the Texas Supreme
Court held that if segregation is required, but the only evidence is
unsegregated, the remedy must be a remand to the trial court for segregation. 269 This holding reduces the harshness of a procedure that
sometimes denied all fees to a party who guessed incorrectly about the
need for segregation.2 7° However, the holding creates a significant potential for wasted court time to address remands and retrials when a
party refuses to segregate fee evidence that an appellate court later
holds should have been segregated.27'
Also, Stewart Title Guaranty Co. may reverse several earlier cases
that allowed a trial judge to (1) refuse to submit a fee issue to the
jury2 2 or (2) disregard a jury answer and refuse to award a fee 2 71 if a
claimant failed to segregate fees when necessary. If a total fee is some
evidence of a segregated fee, then a trial court cannot refuse to submit
an issue supported by some evidence.274 A trial judge also cannot
disregard a jury answer supported by some evidence.2 75 If a jury answer is not supported by sufficient evidence, a trial court's only option
is to grant a new trial.276 What if the trial judge believes segregation
267. Triland Inv. Group v. Warren, 742 S.W.2d 18, 25 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987), rev'd
on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 808-09 (Tex. 1989).
268. Southern Concrete Co. v. Metrotec Fin., 775 S.W.2d 446, 450-51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
269. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Tex. 1991).
270. See, e.g., Hill v. Pierce, 729 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (denying attorney's fees when attorney asked court to segregate but then did not); Wood
v. Component Constr. Corp., 722 S.W.2d 439, 444-45 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ)
(disallowing award because fees not segregated); Crow v. Central Soya Co., Inc., 651 S.W.2d
392, 396 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (agreeing that attorney's fees would
have been awarded if party had segregated fees).
271. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 822 S.W.2d at 11.
272. Verette v. Travellers Indem. Co., 645 S.W.2d 562, 568 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bray v. Curtis, 544 S.W.2d 816, 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
273. Hill, 729 S.W.2d at 342; Crow, 651 S.W.2d at 396.
274. Brown v. Goldstein, 685 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1985).
275. Aim v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tex. 1986).
276. Id.
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is necessary but the claimant disagrees? Can a claimant refuse to
present any evidence other than the total fee which is, after all, admissible as some evidence? Can a claimant argue to the jury that the only
evidence is the total fee and then force the trial judge to choose between awarding the unsegregated fee-contrary to its holding-and
ordering a new trial?
Much of this uncertainty, confusion, and potential for redundant
proceedings and wasted time could be avoided simply by always requiring segregation and completely eliminating the exception for intertwined claims. The exception is judicially created and allows
attorney's fees to be recovered when no statute or contract provides
for them. The exception may encourage claimants to join alternative
claims to intertwine a fee claim into the case. It leads to unpredictable and conflicting results because the test as to the extent of intertwining is standardless and probably indefinable.
Additionally, eliminating this exception would create little hardship on or loss for those claiming attorney's fees. If claims truly are
intertwined, little time should be attributable solely to nonrecoverable
work. The overhead work necessary on all claims-such as drafting
pleadings, proof of background facts, depositions of the primary actors, and preparation for trial-often makes up most of the attorney's
work. Because this work is necessary to prove all claims regardless of
whether the fees are recoverable, the fees would have to be incurred if
only recoverable claims were brought. Thus, the amount that can be
fairly attributed to recoverable claims normally will be a very large
percentage of the total fees incurred, at least if the claims truly
overlap.
Also, eliminating the exception for intertwined claims would resolve the issue of whether the judge or jury decides the segregation
question. While juries often must divide fees among segregated
claims, 277 the court decides which claims must be segregated, perhaps
because a jury does not know the legal elements that must be proved
for particular causes of action. However, the issue is not merely a
comparison of legal elements. Instead, the question is the extent to
277. See International Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Finck, 496 S.W.2d 544, 546-47 (Tex. 1973)
(stating jury properly limited to considering fees for collection of claim under policy); Oxford
Fin. Cos. v. Velez, 807 S.W.2d 460, 464-65 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied) (stating
that fees may be segregated); Schenk v. Ebby Halliday Real Estate, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 361, 369
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, n.w.h.) (fees segregated among DTPA claim and bad faith
counterclaim).
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which an attorney's actions in a particular case were reasonable and
necessary to prosecute recoverable claims. This is a question of fact27 8
and appellate courts often rely upon the evidence in the case rather
than an independent legal analysis that was unavailable to the jury.2 79
In another context, in personal injury cases juries commonly rely
upon the testimony of experts to decide which medical expenses were
reasonable and necessary. There are few reasons why juries could not
do the same for legal expenses. If the experts were to explain why
particular work was reasonably necessary on a recoverable claim, the
jury could then apply the law to the facts. Inconsistent results such as
those noted in the summary above are tolerable in our legal system if
they are the decisions made by juries based on unique fact situations.
These inconsistencies are much less tolerable if they result from decisions made by judges purportedly as a matter of law.
VI.

DEFENSES TO ATTORNEY'S FEES CLAIMS

Naturally, any defense that bars recovery on an underlying claim
will bar recovery of attorney's fees under the DTPA and Chapter 38.
280
Thus, a release of a claim will bar any attorney's fees recovery.
Sovereign immunity 2 ' and res judicata will also bar recovery of
fees.28 2 Lack of privity of contract will bar recovery in Chapter 38

278. See 4M Linen & Uniform Supply Co. v. W.P. Ballard & Co., 793 S.W.2d 320, 32728 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (requiring proof of fees).
279. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 822 S.W.2d at 12; Moody v. EMC Servs., Inc., 828 S.W.2d
237, 248 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied); 4M Linen & Uniform Supply
Co., 793 S.W.2d at 327-28; Coleman v. Rotana, 778 S.W.2d 867, 874 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989,
writ denied); Village Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Porter, 716 S.W.2d 543, 552 (Tex. App.-Austin
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
280. See Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 618 (Tex. 1980) (explicitly affirming holding
for attorney's fees).
281. See, e.g., Rodeheaver v. Steigerwald, 807 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (stating sovereign immunity bars attorney's fees award); City of
Houston v. De Trapani, 771 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ
denied) (determining that state immunities from liability for attorney's fees not waived); Texas
Dep't of Human Servs. v. Methodist Retirement Servs., Inc., 763 S.W.2d 613, 614 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1989 no writ) (holding that state immune from paying award of attorney's fees
unless statute dictates otherwise); City of Houston v. Lee, 762 S.W.2d 180, 188 (Tex. App.Houston [ist Dist.] 1988) (stating that government not liable for attorney's fees award), rev'd
on other grounds, 807 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1991).
282. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Robert P. Kaminsky, M.D., 820 S.W.2d 878, 882
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).
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cases2 83 but not DTPA suits.
No attorney's fees are due from a party who can show the matter
could have been resolved without resort to the courts. Thus, for
claims under Chapter 38, no fees are recoverable if the amount owed
is tendered within thirty days of presentment of the claim.2 84 Under
the DTPA, neither attorney's fees nor treble damages are recoverable
if, within sixty days of presentment, a written settlement offer is made
that is substantially the same as the actual damages ultimately found
by the trier of fact. 285 The tender cannot be subject to unwarranted
conditions 286 and must include any reasonable attorney's fees
requested.28 7
Payment beyond the statutory thirty or sixty days, even full payment of the underlying debt, will not defeat the right to attorney's
fees.2 88 Before 1977, Article 2226 provided for recovery of fees only if
the claimant "should finally obtain judgment." 28 9 This language had
been interpreted to bar recovery of attorney's fees if the debtor paid
the underlying claim before judgment, no matter how much effort had
been wasted. 290 By deleting this phrase from Article 2226, the legislature allowed suit for attorney's fees regardless of full payment if the
payment was not made within the statutorily required period.2 9
The defendant in a DTPA claim may also seek her own attorney's
fees if the consumer's action was groundless and brought in bad faith

283. Graham v. Turcotte, 628 S.W.2d 182, 183-84 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no

writ).
284. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.002 (Vernon 1986).
285. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.505(d) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
286. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. La Villa Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 S.W.2d 102, 107
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ) (offering amount less than amount claimed insufficient to avoid award of fees).
287. Cail v. Service Motors, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex. 1983).
288. Buckner Glass & Mirror, Inc., v. T.A. Pritchard Co., 697 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ) (noting that requirement for obtaining judgment to get
attorney's fees is negated by statutory language).
289. Act of May 17, 1971, 62d Leg., R.S., ch. 225, 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 563, repealedby
Act of Sept. 1, 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, § 9(1), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 797 (codified at TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1991)).
290. Johnson-Walker Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Lane Container Co., 548 S.W.2d 500,
501-02 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); National Homes Corp. v. C.J.
Builders, Inc., 393 S.W.2d 949, 951-52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ dism'd).
291. Buckner Glass & Mirror,Inc., 697 S.W.2d at 714; Enriquez v. K & D Dev. & Constr., Inc., 567 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); but cf. Diaz v.
Robert Ruiz, Inc., 808 F.2d 427, 428 (5th Cir. 1987) (refusing to allow attorney's fees where
contract claim settled before trial).
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or to harass.29 2 The decision is for the court, not the jury, and the
court may look to all the circumstances of the dispute, including evidence that is inadmissible.293
"Groundless" means "no basis in law or fact and not warranted by
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law."' 294 Claims are not groundless merely because the jury
rejects them2 95 or the trial court directs a verdict.29 6 Conversely, a
claim may be groundless even if it survives a directed verdict
motion.297
"Bad faith" means that the claim was motivated by a malicious or
discriminatory purpose. 298 "Harassment" encompasses only cases
where the sole purpose of the proceeding was harassment. Seeking
recovery of even a small amount of monetary damages would defeat
such a finding.2 99
VII.

THE JURY CHARGE

As the amount of attorney's fees is a question of fact,3"° it should be
submitted to the jury if supported by some evidence. The Committee
on Pattern Jury Charges of the State Bar of Texas has published suggested attorney's fees questions, both for cash30 1 and contingency percentage312 claims. Further, the Committee has suggested that a party
may request an alternative submission, asking a jury to find both a
cash and a percentage amount, with the claimant choosing whichever
sum is more after the verdict is returned.3 °3 The Committee's charge
does not include the list of factors that may be considered by a jury
292. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon 1987).

293. Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex. 1989).
294. See id. (holding that lower court erred to equate groundlessness with evidence).
295. Rutherford v. Riata Cadillac Co., 809 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1991, writ denied).
296. Central Tex. Hardware, Inc. v. First City, Tex., 810 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
297. See Splettstosser v. Myer, 779 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam) (noting that
"groundlessness" should be determined by totality of evidence).
298. Id.
299. Donwerth, 775 S.W.2d at 638.
300. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Tex. 1991); Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Britton, 406 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Tex. 1966).
301. 4 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, PAT-ERN JURY CHARGES PJC 110.15 (1990).
302. Id., PJC 110.16.
303. 4 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 110.15 commentary at 11027 to 110-28 (1990).
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because this would be unnecessary. 3°4 The charge also does not include the usual "if any" language because recovery of fees under
Chapter 38 and the DTPA is mandatory.3 0°
The same broad inquiry into reasonableness is proper in cases
where a contract sets a percentage fee. Although the potentially liable
party must prove that a lesser amount is reasonable, no separate question is required because the question is implied in a finding that a
lesser fee is reasonable.3a 6
If attorney's fees should be segregated, the jury should be instructed to segregate and then award fees only on that work attributable to recoverable claims.307 This can be accomplished first by
conditioning the attorney's fees question on a "Yes" answer to questions relating to recoverable claims. Then, the jury can be given an
instruction in the fee question similar to the following: "You are instructed to limit your answer to fees attributable to legal services performed on any claims as to which you have answered "Yes" in
Question No. 1 [e.g., DTPA] or Question No. 2 [e.g., breach of
contract]."
If demand is contested, a jury question on that issue should be requested. If it is not, the court will imply a finding of demand in support of the judgment if there is some evidence of demand in the
record.308 However, the court may not make this deemed finding if
there is no evidence of demand.30 9

304. See Fox v. Boese, 566 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1978,

writ ref'd n.r.e.) (determining that reasonable fee does not require jury instruction).
305. See Satellite Earth Stations East, Inc. v. Davis, 756 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. App.-

Eastland 1988, writ denied) (declaring that consumer "shall be" awarded fees in DTPA case);
Arguelles v. Kaplan, 736 S.W.2d 782, 787 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

(reasoning that award of attorney's fee is question of fact for jury).
306. See F.R. Hernandez Constr. & Supply Co. v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce of Brownsville, 578 S.W.2d 675, 678-79 (Tex. 1979) (holding that contractual attorney's fees are pre-

sumed unreasonable).
307. See International Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Finck, 496 S.W.2d 544, 546-47 (Tex. 1973)
(reversing attorney's fees not based on trial prep work); Schenk v. Ebby Halliday Real Estate,
Inc., 803 S.W.2d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ) (noting that jury was in-

structed to separate fees).
308. See Cielo Dorado Dev., Inc. v. Certainteed Corp., 744 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Tex. 1988)

(holding TEX. R. Civ. P. 279 requires court to deem finding of adequate notice when no
objection and some evidence to support).
309. Automobile Ins. Co of Hartford, Conn. v. Davila, 805 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
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THE JUDGMENT

An award of attorney's fees, of course, should be included in the
judgment signed by the court.31 0 Unless a statute provides otherwise,
the judgment should award attorney's fees to the party in the case, not
the attorney. 31' Absent an order disregarding a jury verdict or a remittitur, the court must enter judgment for the amount found by a
jury and not a greater 31 2 or lesser 31 3 amount. Attorney's fees should
be offset in the judgment against any amount awarded to the opposing
party.3tl
When an election of remedies is required, a claimant must consider
the effect on any fee award. Electing a remedy for which attorney's
fees are not authorized waives any fees, and any attorney's fees award
should be omitted from the judgment.315
At the time the judgment is signed, it is unknown whether there
will be an appeal. But appellate fees are recoverable only in the event
of an appeal. Accordingly, a judgment including appellate fees may
be drafted in one of two ways:
1. "Fee plus"-awarding the amount of attorney's fees through trial
plus a separate amount to be awarded in the event appellate work is
necessary; or
2.

"Fee minus"-awarding the amount of attorney's fees for all trial
and appellate work minus an amount to be remitted in the event
appellate work is not necessary. Either form is acceptable, but the

310. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 301 (dictating that one judgment must include all claims).
311. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.18(a) (Vernon 1992) (providing for payment di-

rectly to attorney).
312. CPS Int'l, Inc. v. Harris & Westmoreland, 784 S.W.2d 538, 542-43 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1990, no writ); City of Dallas v. Arnett, 762 S.W.2d 942, 955 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, writ denied); Williams v. Northrup, 649 S.W.2d 740, 748 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
313. Phillips v. Phillips, 820 S.W.2d 785, 787-88 n.2 (Tex. 1991); Baker v. Int'l Record
Syndicate, 812 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ); Gerdes v. Mustang Exploration Co., 666 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ). Failure to object
waives such error. Texas Cookie Co. v. Hendricks & Peralta, Inc., 747 S.W.2d 873, 882 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
314. Murrco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no
writ); Satellite Earth Stations East, Inc. v. Davis, 756 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1988, writ denied); Streeter v. Thompson, 751 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988,
no writ).
315. Marcus, Stowell & Beye Gov't Sec., Inc. v. Jefferson Inv. Corp., 797 F.2d 227, 235
(5th Cir. 1986).
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31 6

A party cannot be penalized for appealing an improper judgment.
Thus, the judgment should condition an award of appellate fees not
just on an appeal but on an unsuccessful appeal by the party against

whom fees are assessed.3 17 If the award is not conditioned on an un-

successful appeal, this condition is normally implied and the judgment so reformed on appeal.318 If the party awarded appellate
attorney's fees is completely unsuccessful on appeal, no appellate fees
are recoverable.31 9 If the party awarded appellate fees is successful in
part, the appellate court must remand for a finding of a reasonable fee
as to the successful part.32°
In a bench trial, findings of fact and conclusions of law should be
requested if a party intends to appeal a judgment for attorney's fees
316. International Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d 347, 349-50 (Tex. 1971).
317. Smith v. Smith, 757 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied); Memorial City Gen. Hosp. Corp. v. Cintas Corp., 679 S.W.2d 133, 139 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1984, no writ); Siegler v. Williams, 658 S.W.2d 236, 241 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1983, no writ).
318. CPS Int'l, Inc., 784 S.W.2d at 544; Kold-Serve Corp. v. Ward, 736 S.W.2d 750, 756
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ dism'd by agr.); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 669 S.W.2d 759, 766
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 687
S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1985); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Cortez, 562 S.W.2d 940, 945 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo), rev'd on other grounds, 576 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1978); but cf. Siegler, 658
S.W.2d at 241 (holding unconditioned appellate fee awards reversible error); King Optical v.
Automatic Data Processing of Dallas, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 213, 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (disallowing unconditioned appellate fee award).
319. See Bodnow Corp. v. City of Hondo, 721 S.W.2d 839, 840 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam)
(awarding appellate expenses); LaFreniere v. Fitzgerald, 669 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Tex. 1984);
Conann Constructors, Inc. v. Muller, 618 S.W.2d 564, 569 (Tex. App.-Austin 1981, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (awarding expenses where appellant successful). In declaratory judgment cases
where the change from prevailing to losing party does not necessarily require a change in a fee
recovery, remand for redetermination by the trial court is appropriate. See Graham v. City of
Lakewood Village, 796 S.W.2d 800, 804-05 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied) (finding remand appropriate to provide for trial court discretion); Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v.
Banque Arabe Internationale D'Investissement, 747 S.W.2d 926, 931 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, writ denied); but cf. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 796 S.W.2d
763, 770-72 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (providing that appellant must invoke rule
by filing point of error).
320. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Vollmer, 805 S.W.2d 825, 834 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1991, writ denied); Ambassador Dev. Corp. v. Valdez, 791 S.W.2d 612, 624-25 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ); Smith, 757 S.W.2d at 426; Siegler, 658 S.W.2d at 241. But
cf. Rittgers v. Rittgers, 802 S.W.2d 109, 115 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied)
(rendering judgment denying all appellate fees even though appeal was only partially successful). In Twin City Fire Ins. Co., the court suggested in dicta that an appellate court could
require a remittitur if an appeal was partially successful. Twin City FireIns. Co., 562 S.W.2d
at 945. This seems inconsistent with the rule that such fees must be set by the trial court.
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after a bench trial. Absent this request, all necessary findings and
conclusions will be deemed in favor of the judgment.32 Further, a
finding as to a reasonable contingency percentage allows the appellate
court to render judgment rather than remand if the amount of the
underlying judgment has been modified on appeal.322
Prejudgment interest is not allowed on.attorney's fees.323 Postjudgment interest is provided by statute and is set at the lesser of 10% and
the consumer credit commissioner's rate.324 Several older cases hold
that a higher contractual rate may be applied for contracts specifying
a stipulated percentage of the balance as attorney's fees.325 Postjudgment interest should not begin to run on an award of appellate fees
until an appeal is perfected.326
Generally, a judgment setting a reasonable fee does not change the
underlying fee agreement between an attorney and her client. In one
case, a court limited the attorney-client contract to the amount found
by the jury as a reasonable fee. 327 However, this was a class action
case and the holding was based on the lack of notice to all clients in
the class. The court stated that "a trial court under proper circumstances may enforce a contingent fee agreement that allows a recovery
greater than the amount found by a jury as the reasonable value of the
attorney's services, ' 328 but the court did not indicate what those
proper circumstances might be.
321. Shenandoah Ass'n v. J & K Properties, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 470, 484 (Tex. App.Dallas 1987, writ denied).
322. Mack v. Moore, 669 S.W.2d 415, 420 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1984, no
writ).
323. Hervey v. Passero, 658 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tex. 1983) (per curiam); Vollmer, 805
S.W.2d at 834; McCann v. Brown, 725 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no
writ); cf.Smith v. Davis, 453 S.W.2d 340, 349-50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970, writ

ref'd n.r.e.) (disapproving of cases awarding prejudgment interest for attorney's fees).
324. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (Vernon Supp. 1992).

325. Tsesmelis v. Sinton State Bank, 53 S.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932,
judgment adopted); Clarke v. Gauntt, 149 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1941),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 161 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1942,
judgment adopted); see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05, § I (Vernon Supp.
1992) (requiring that rate of interest in award be rate set in contract or be 18%); Smith, 453
S.W.2d at 349-50 (noting that some courts have awarded prejudgment interest when attorney's
fees is set percentage).
326. Vollmer, 805 S.W.2d at 834 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied); Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Beard, 400 S.W.2d 853, 859-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
327. Arnett, 762 S.W.2d at 955.
328. Id.
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APPEALING ATTORNEY'S FEES

As with other appellate matters, preservation of error and assignment on appeal are necessary to challenge a fee award. Objection
must be made in the trial court to complain that a fee award is insufficient 329 or that there was no demand. 330 Without an assignment of
error on appeal, an appellate court cannot reverse an improper denial
of attorney's fees 3 31 nor a fee award based on testimony by an undesignated witness.3 32 If no record is made for appeal, it will be hard to
show that the fee award was improper based on the evidence.3 33
The standard of appellate review for attorney's fee awards made by
a judge sitting as trier of fact is somewhat perplexing. Usually, findings of the judge or jury are subject to challenge for legal or factual
insufficiency.3 34 Jury findings as to attorney's fees are routinely reviewed upon that basis and some courts use the same standard to review fee findings by a judge.3 35
However, several cases state that a judge's award of attorney's fees
should be reviewed merely for abuse of discretion. 336 This is clearly

329. Milt Ferguson Motor Co. v. Zeretzke, 827 S.W.2d 349, 360 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1991, n.w.h.); Texas Am. Corp. v. Woodbridge Joint Venture, 809 S.W.2d 299, 304
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied); Morey v. Page, 802 S.W.2d 779, 787 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
330. All Valley Acceptance Co. v. Durfey, 800 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tex. App.-Austin
1990, writ denied).
331. Texas Nat'l Bank v. Karnes, 717 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).
332. Northwest Otolaryngology Assocs. v. Mobilease, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 399, 406 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied).
333. Olivares v. Porter Poultry & Egg Co., 523 S.W.2d 726, 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1975, no writ); Pockrus v. Connelly, 521 S.W.2d 115, 117-18 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
334. W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Appellate Review in Civil Appeals, 21 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 865, 919-20 (1990); see also McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696-98 (Tex.
1986) (discussing sufficiency or evidence standard upon appellate review).
335. Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Speakman, 736 S.W.2d 874, 884-64 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1987, no writ).
336. Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex. 1990) (per
curiam); Inwood North Homeowners' Ass'n v. Wilkes, 813 S.W.2d 156, 157 (Tex. App.Houston (14th Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.); Jackson's Indus. Supplies, Inc. v. Cochran, 809 S.W.2d
802, 807 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, n.w.h.); Guerra v. Brown, 800 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ); Northwest Otolaryngology Assocs., 786 S.W.2d at 406;
Minor v. Aland, 775 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); Rosas v. Bursey,
724 S.W.2d 402, 410-11 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); City of Houston v. Blackbird,
658 S.W.2d 269, 274 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ dism'd); Reintsma v. Greater
Austin Apartment Maintenance, 549 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ

dism'd).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

47

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 24 [2022], No. 2, Art. 1

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:313

true for recovery under the Declaratory Judgment Act 3 37 or other
statutes where a fee award is discretionary. 338 A court abuses its discretion only if the action taken is so arbitrary and unreasonable that it
amounts to a clear and prejudicial error of law33 9 or the action is contrary to the only conclusion that is compelled by the facts. 3a4 A court
also abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding
rules and principles.34 1 Obviously, this is a lower standard than
would be used to review a fee awarded by a jury.
Several anomalies result from this confusion. For example, in one
case the only evidence supported a fee award of $10,000 but the trial
court awarded no fees and the appellate court found no abuse of discretion. 34 2 This would not have been the result if the decision had
been appealed from an identical jury verdict.34 3 Another court reviewed fee awards under the Declaratory Judgment Act and Chapter

38 by the same abuse of discretion standard 3 " even though fees are
left entirely to the court's discretion under the first but are mandatory
under the latter.

Possibly, the relaxed standard of review in bench trials may be the
result of the availability of judicial notice under Chapter 38. One
court has suggested that abuse of discretion review is appropriate be-

cause the judge may take notice of "various intangibles incapable of

337. Oake v. Collin County, 692 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Tex. 1985); see also Pierce v. Gillespie,
761 S.W.2d 390, 397 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ) (discounting cross-point complaining denial of attorney's fees because party did not object to fee issue at trial court).
338. E.g. Alford v. Whaley, 794 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990,
no writ) (guardian ad litem fee); Brown v. Brown, 520 S.W.2d 571, 578-79 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd) (divorce).
339. Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1989).
340. Freeman v. Bianchi, 820 SW.2d 853, 858 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991,
n.w.h.).
341. Wright v. Brooks, 773 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ
denied).
342. Pontiac v. Elliott, 775 S.W.2d 395, 401 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1989, writ
denied).
343. E.g., Satellite Earth Stations East, Inc. v. Davis, 756 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. App.Eastland 1988, writ denied); Jess v. Libson, 742 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no
writ); Great State Petroleum v. Arrow Rig Serv., 706 S.W.2d 803, 811-12 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1986, no writ); Coffey v. Young, 704 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986,
no writ); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Crow, 704 S.W.2d 849, 854 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no
writ).
344. E.g., Edwin M. Jones Oil Co. v. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co., 794 S.W.2d 442, 44849 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
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review.' ' 4 5 However, judicial notice under Chapter 38 is limited to
the contents of the case file and the customary fees, matters that are
neither intangible nor incapable of review.
Whatever the standard of review, as with other damage awards,
courts may reduce, by remittitur, a fee award that is excessive. 346 The
standard for remittitur is the same as that for factual sufficiency; only
awards that are against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence may be remitted.347 If the only evidence in the record supports an amount less than the fee award, remittitur will be granted to
limit the judgment to the amount supported by the evidence.348
Disposition after reversal on appeal depends upon the reason for
reversal, the evidence, and the type case involved. If a judgment denying all attorney's fees is reversed, the appellate court must remand
to the trial court to make the finding of a reasonable fee. 49 Several
exceptions exist. If the trial court has determined the applicable fee
but erroneously failed to award it, the appeals court may render judgment for the amount already established. 5 Similarly, if the trial
345. Mack v. Moore, 669 S.W.2d 415, 420 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no
writ).
346. Giles v. Cardenas, 697 S.W.2d 422, 429-30 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Medi-Rents, Inc., 687 S.W.2d 499, 502 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ); Jack Roach Ford v. De Urdanavia, 659 S.W.2d 725, 730 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ); Wuagneux Builders, Inc. v. Candlewood Builders,
Inc., 651 S.W.2d 919, 923 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ); Allied Fin. Co. v. Garza,
626 S.W.2d 120, 126-28 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Argonaut Ins. Co.
v. ABC Steel Prods. Co., 582 S.W.2d 883, 888-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
347. Snoke v. Republic Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Tex. 1989) (per
curiam). A number of earlier cases had suggested a different standard for remittitur of attorney's fees awards based on independent appellate consideration of the testimony, the nature of
the case, the amount in controversy, and the common knowledge of the justices as lawyers.
See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Arnett, 762 S.W.2d 942, 957 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied);
Giles, 697 S.W.2d at 429; Travelers Ins. Co., 687 S.W.2d at 502.
348. Valley Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Molina, 818 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1991, writ denied); Bradbury v. Scott, 788 S.W.2d 31, 40 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1989, writ denied); Delhi Gas Corp. v. Lamb, 724 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
349. First Nat'l Bank of Mercedes v. La Sara Grain Co., 676 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ). The same rule applies to an award of no appellate fees.
Gunter v. Bailey, 808 S.W.2d 163, 165-66 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, n.w.h.).
350. Keeper v. First Care, Inc., 794 S.W.2d 879, 882-83 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no
writ); Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc. v. Koenig, 794 S.W.2d 514, 518 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1990, writ denied); Estate of Kaiser v. Gifford, 692 S.W.2d 525, 527-28 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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court has improperly calculated a stipulated percentage fee, the appeals court may render judgment for the correct amount.351 If the
expert testimony has been clear, direct, positive, and free from contradiction by other evidence or the circumstances of the case, the appellate court may render judgment for the amount stated in such
testimony. 52
If a judgment is reversed for failure to segregate fees among recoverable claims, the court must remand for segregation.353 If a judgment granting fees is reversed for other reasons, such as the failure to
offer any evidence or the failure to prove that a particular fee was
reasonable, the general rule remains that the case should be remanded
for a new trial.354 However, some courts have held to the contrary.355
Normally, judgment is rendered and the case is not remanded if there
was no proof. It is unclear why an exception should be made for
attorney's fees.3 56

If a summary judgment granting fees is reversed for no evidence,
then a fact issue remains that must be remanded.357 If a default judgment granting fees is reversed for no evidence, again the proper disposition appears to be a remand to receive such evidence.358
X.

CONCLUSION

Proof of attorney's fees at trial is an issue fraught with pitfalls, op351. Bernal v. Garrison, 818 S.W.2d 79, 85 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied); Hodges v. Star Lumber & Hardware Co., 544 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1976, no writ).
352. Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at 881.
353. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Tex. 1991).
354. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Arkla Equip. Co., 528 S.W.2d 568, 570-71
(Tex. 1975); Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Britton, 406 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Tex. 1966); Smith v.
Smith, 757 S.W.2d 423, 426-27 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
355. Moody v. EMC Servs., Inc., 828 S.W.2d 237, 248 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1992, n.w.h.); American Commercial Colleges, Inc. v. Davis, 821 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1991, n.w.h.); Bolton v. Alvarado, 762 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
356. See Leggett v. Brinson, 817 S.W.2d 154, 160 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, n.w.h.)
(Osborn, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that DTPA still requires some evidence of reasonable attorney's fees before such can be awarded).
357. Pelto Oil Co. v. CSK Oil & Gas Corp., 804 S.W.2d 583, 588 (Tex. App.-Houston
[ist Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
358. Fairmont Homes, Inc. v. Upchurch, 704 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1986), modified on other grounds, 711 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); Blumenthal v. Ameritex Computer Corp., 646 S.W.2d 283, 287-88 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no
writ).
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tions, opportunities for waiver, and second chances. In view of the
increasingly complex rules surrounding proof of attorney's fees, this
issue can no longer be treated as an afterthought. Because of the high
cost of litigation, reimbursement of attorney's fees often determines
whether or not a client will view the litigation as successful. Careful
thought needs to be given to the preparation of this aspect of any case.
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